VALUES
DREAMS
IDEALS
MUSLIM YOUTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SURVEYS IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA
# Table of Content

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omain technology - readily available and unrestricted – has become part of youth culture. Almost 85% of young people use the internet, taking them beyond borders and exposing them to different cultures, views and value-systems. While youngsters in both countries grow up in societies that have adopted seemingly liberal political systems and a culture of consumption, they are also courted by fundamentalists, who believe that democracy, individual rights and open markets are not reconcilable with their Islamic values. With so many different influences at work, we wonder were these young people are heading.

This Muslim Youth Survey – envisioned to be the start of a periodic poll – was conducted in both countries in October and in November 2010. 1,060 people aged 15 to 25 were surveyed in Malaysia, 1,496 in Indonesia. Both surveys were conducted by trained interviewers, whose face-to-face conversations with the respondents took more than an hour. We focused on personal development, family orientation, religion, politics, social environment, lifestyle and values. Respondents provided generous information about their family life, their recreational activities, their professional and personal goals and their political orientation. They also told us about the role of Islam in their lives.

We hope that this survey will draw attention to the concerns of youngsters and lead to wider public discourse.

The future of the country – any country – will be shaped by its youth. Youngsters set trends and change societies. In Malaysia and Indonesia, countries with Muslim majorities, young generations are huge: more than half of the population is less than 30 years old, about one third is younger than 14. In Indonesia, 200 million Muslims – 88% of the population – constitute the largest Muslim population world-wide. In Malaysia, 16 million Muslims account for 60% of the population. Far away from Islam’s region of origin, Muslims in these two South East Asian states have their own customs and traditions, distinguishing them culturally and linguistically from Muslims in the Middle East.

How does Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s Muslim Youth feel about their respective country, their family, their society? Do youngsters care about politics? How religious are they? What are their needs, their problems? Who do they turn to? Are they happy? Optimistic? We don’t know much. That’s why we asked young people in both countries what they think, feel, believe, fear, aspire to and hope for. We cooperated with the authors of the Shell Youth Study, which has been conducted in Germany since 1953.

Young people face peer pressure from social groups they are part of in schools, universities or work places. In Indonesia and in Malaysia, most youngsters grow up in conservative households, where religious values are stressed. At the same time, many young Muslims live in and embrace a globalised world. In

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We thank the more than 2,500 young people who participated in this survey. This project would not have been possible without your engagement and your trust.

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Muslim Youth in Southeast Asia
Surveys in Malaysia and Indonesia
**Malaysia**

**West Malaysia is a Peninsula South of Thailand, Stretching Down to Singapore and East Malaysia Comprises the Provinces Sarawak and Sabah on the Island of Borneo. Malaysia Neighbours Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand.**

**Political System**
Malaysia is a federal, parliamentary monarchy, based on the Westminster-system. The country consists of 13 states and 3 federal territories (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and the island Labuan). Nine states are ruled by Sultans and four (Malakka, Penang, Sabah and Sarawak) by elected governors. The king is elected every five years out of the sultans. Since 2007 King Mizan Zainal Abidin is the official head of state, present Prime Minister is Najib Tun Razak. The two-chamber parliament consists of the House of Representatives Dewan Rakyat and the Senate Dewan Negara.

Malaysia’s predominant political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has held power in a coalition known as the Barisan Nasional with a shifting number of other parties – 13 at present – since Malaysia's independence from the UK in 1957. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, his deputy and the heads of the most important political departments have always been members of the UMNO.

Election age in Malaysia is 21 years.

**Development of GDP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>225 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>219 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>219 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- GDP per Capita: 14,700 US$ (2010)
- GDP Real Growth Rate: 7.1% (2010)
- Population below poverty line: 5.1% (2007)

**GDP - Composition by Sectors**

- Industry: 49.3%
- Agriculture: 9.1%
- Service: 41.6%

**Indonesia**

**Archipelago with 17,508 Islands (6,000 uninhabited). Indonesia is a Democratic Country with the World’s Largest Muslim Population. A Direct Neighbor of Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Papua New Guinea, Indonesia is the Fourth Most Populated Country in the World.**

**Political System**
Indonesia is a presidential republic. The president is chief of state and chief executive and is directly elected by the people every five years. Current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected in 2009 with a majority of 61%. The Indonesian parliament, Majelis Permusyawaratan (MPR), consists of the House of Representatives, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) and the Senate, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD).

There are 560 representatives in the parliament, who are elected by proportional representation in 77 electoral districts. The 33 provinces of Indonesia are represented in the province, every province can send up to four representatives, depending on its size. There is a 2.5% hurdle to be elected to parliament. The secular parties have received a majority over the religious parties in each election since 2009. Voting right is automatically acquired when Indonesians turn 17 years old.

**Development of GDP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>511.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>539.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>695.1 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- GDP per Capita: 4,300 US$ (2010)
- Population below the poverty line: 13.3% (2003)

**GDP - Composition by Sectors**

- Industry: 46.4%
- Agriculture: 16.9%
- Service: 37.1%
COUNTRY INFORMATION

MALAYSIA

RELIGION

(2010)

- Muslims (Sunnis) 60.4%
- Buddhists 6.3%
- Christians 19.2%
- Confucianism, Taoism and other Chinese religions 0.8%
- Hindus 1.5%
- Christians 1.0%
- Confucianism, Taoism and other Chinese religions 1.2%
- others 2.6%
- none 0.8%

SCHOOL ENROLLMENT

PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

- 94% of girls and boys are in primary school
- 94%

SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

- 71% of girls and 66% of boys are in secondary school
- 66%

TERTIARY ENROLLMENT

- 36% of the population of tertiary age are in tertiary education
- 36%

LITERACY RATE

- 92% of adults and 98% of youth are literate (2010)
- 98%

ETNICITIES

The three largest ethnic groups in Malaysia are Malays (50.4 %), Chinese (23.7 %) and Indian (21 %). Moreover, there are various indigenous groups and ethnic sub-groups.

SCHOOL SYSTEM

The Malaysian school system consists of two stages: From 7 until 12 years old, Malaysian children go to Elementary School. There are two types: the public Sekolah Kebangsaan and the traditional Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan. Lessons are held in Malay in the public elementary schools, and in Chinese or Tamil in the traditional schools.

Secondary school in Malaysia, Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan, is divided into five one-year terms.

There are public, private and state-funded schools.

UNIVERSITIES

The public and numerous private universities in Malaysia offer good studying conditions for Malaysia 600,000 students. There is a special focus on technical degrees.

The Bumiputra-policy of the Malaysian government – high privileges for the Malay and indigenous population groups – is dominating the public education system. Access to public universities is facilitated for Malays through various scholarships. Chinese and Indian students have to rely more on private schools or on studies abroad.

The Ministry of Education is in charge of the public schools. The large network of religious schools, network of religious schools, -schools have basically the same curriculum as public schools, but they have a strong focus on religious issues.

Indonesian children in the age of 7-12 go to elementary school. There are between 150 and 250 dialects spoken.

ETHNICITIES

More than 30 larger ethnic groups, largest minorities: Indonesians of Chinese, Indian, Arab and Melanesian origin. In total more than 500 ethnic sub-groups. Besides the official language Bahasa Indonesia there are between 150 and 250 dialects spoken.

SCHOOL SYSTEM

Indonesian children in the age of 7-12 go to elementary school, Sekolah Dasar (13-15 years) and three years SMA (Sekolah Menengah Atas) or SMP (Sekolah Menengah Pertama) (13-15 years) and three years. High School is then composed of three years of secondary school.

The Ministry of Education is in charge of the public schools. The large network of religious schools, Madrasah, is run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Madrasah-schools have basically the same curriculum as public schools, but they have a strong focus on religious issues.

COUNTRY INFORMATION

INDONESIA

RELIGION

(2010)

- Islam 88%
- Protestant and Catholic Christians 8%
- Hindu 8%
- Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism 2%
- Interreligious and others 1%

SCHOOL ENROLLMENT

PRIMARY ENROLLMENT

- 94% of girls and 97% of boys are in primary school
- 97%

SECONDARY ENROLLMENT

- 68% of girls and 69% of boys are in secondary school
- 69%

TERTIARY ENROLLMENT

- 21% of the population of tertiary age are in tertiary education
- 21%

LITERACY RATE

- 92% of adults and 97% of youth are literate (2010)
- 97%

TELECOMMUNICATION

NUMBER OF MOBILE PHONES (2009)

- 30.4 mill.
- 64.6 % of the population have internet access

LABOUR FORCE (BY OCCUPATION)

(estimate 2010)

- Industry 49%
- Agriculture 36%
- Service 13%

- Unemployment: 3.4% (2011)

- Unemployment rate: 7.1% (estimate 2010)

UNIVERSITIES

There are around 80 state Universities in Indonesia and more than 2,200 private schools.

Moreover, there are private schools and boarding schools, among the latter are the Pesantren, whose students get a religious education but are also taught in conventional subjects. Momentarily, approximately 3.1 million Indonesian are enrolled in the 14,067 Indonesian Pesantren.

The Ministry of Education is in charge of the public schools. The large network of religious schools, Madrasah, is run by the Ministry of Religion. The Madrasah-schools have basically the same curriculum as public schools, but they have a strong focus on religious issues.

SURVEYS IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

• Unemployment: 3.4% (2011)
• Unemployment rate: 7.1% (estimate 2010)
Muslim Youth in Southeast Asia
Surveys in Malaysia and Indonesia
INTRODUCTION

Youth, as defined to cover the ages of 15-25 years in this survey, is a period of high energy and enthusiasm coupled with idealism and invincibility. The environment and society in which youths dwell have a very significant impact on how they utilize their talents, strengths, energy and idealism.

The milieu of the youths in Malaysia, the home environment, the media, education, government policies and societal values all have a profound effect on shaping them. Since they grow up in the post independence era of Malaysia, the youths are brought up in a period of rapid economic growth and modernization, fast changing technologies, globalization and international developments, changing family structures and rising individualism. These surroundings and knowledge influence the lifestyle, values, religious belief, social relations, political affiliations as well as personal and social visions.

PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE MUSLIM YOUTHS IN MALAYSIA ARE A GENERALLY HAPPY AND CONTENTED GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO ARE RATHER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF MALAYSIA.

Their contentment is understandable as they have not suffered hardships on a major scale in this young country. Malaysia is in general politically stable, economically sound in spite of the usual share of economic downturns and it has not suffered any devastating natural and social calamities. Education up to tertiary level is accessible to and used by the vast majority of youths, largely facilitated for Malay (and therefore Muslim) youth on the basis of Malaysia's New Economic Policy since the 1970s.

Besides encouraging the private sector to provide skill training for the youth, the government has implemented several programmes such as community colleges for vocational training and skill training centres for the unemployed and new job seeking graduates. The skill training is not only meant to help them qualify for employment in the various industries but also to instigate their own businesses.

With the availability of educational and skill training opportunities for Muslim youths and the economic wellbeing in the country, it is therefore not unexpected that the majority of them are sure to be able to study or work in their desired field. That said, such confidence is tempered for some by fear of losing jobs or not finding jobs quickly and staying unemployed for some time.

However, Muslim youths are not immune to the good things in life. Becoming rich or having lots of assets ranks in third place on their list of priorities. The way to wealth shows an interesting mix of modern and collectivist or traditional attitudes when we consider that 94.9% of the youth believe that hard work will pay off; 82.1% believe that the wealth gap is warranted due to hard work. But a large minority of 48.4% still take a fatalistic approach on wealth and success; this fatalistic approach, however, may also be due to the fact that the state is known “to provide”, and especially so for the overwhelmingly Muslim Bumiputra population which currently still receives economic favours due to the continuation of the economic policies mentioned before. On the other hand differences between age groups are also reflecting experience in the workforce without necessarily exposing attitudes towards religion (fatalism). The experience of individual responsibility seems to have resulted in a clear pattern for questions involving attitudes towards one’s career. Answers to “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?” – Hard work does pay off “shows that those more in the bottom age ranges (15-17 and 18-19) disagree while those in the upper age ranges (20-22 and 23-25) agree.

Another striking change is the general appeal for jobs in the civil service. Generations before the current group of youths - and starting with the privileges during British colonial rule – working positions in the public sector had been the fulfilment of aspirations with high social appeal. Though a fair number of youth today would still want to work for the government, it is not on the top list of their goals and dreams in life, it ranks in fourth place for them.
Sex education is a very important vehicle for social mobility, particularly understood and used as such by the Malays in Malaysia, and the government gives great importance to this, thus the youths are in general well educated: only 2.6% drop out of school and have not just primary school education. The rest has attained secondary diplomas (mainly O-Level certificates), vocational diplomas or university education.

The importance of getting quality education is fully acknowledged by the youth as it is just below the first-ranked item, “living in a safe neighbourhood”. More females consider getting quality education as important and this could account for the significantly higher percentage of females in tertiary education in Malaysia today. As would be expected: the higher the education level of the respondents is, the higher is the rating for the importance of quality education.

**FAMILY ORIENTATION**

**TODAY’S YOUTHS IN MALAYSIA BELIEVE THAT A PERSON WITH A FAMILY IS HAPPIER THAN SINGLES.**

Muslim youths consider marrying and having children as very important. 94.2% believe that living with a family makes one happier than otherwise. They (73.3%) want at least two children. There is no gender preference, which shows an appreciation of gender equality in family values. Polygamy is rejected by 60.5% of all male and by 85.1% of all female respondents, which is remarkable considering otherwise overwhelmingly favourable attitudes towards social and religious conservatism (see below).

![FIGURE 4](image)

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know / No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polygamy is ok</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex education is needed in schools</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>66.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today’s youth in Malaysia believe that a person with a family is happier than singles. This belief may be influenced by the good relationship the youths have with their parents and siblings. More than 90% of respondents get along well with their families and often share the same opinions. Their parents care for them and give them guidance. They indicate that their parents tell them what to do and how to be good Muslims.

![FIGURE 5](image)

**How is your relationship with your parents? Are the following statements right or rather wrong?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know / No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My parents don’t care</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t trust my parents</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My parents always tell me what I have to do</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We talk and most of the time I get to voice my desires/opinion</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![FIGURE 6](image)

**From where did you know about Islam?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local teachers (i.e. including imam, khalif, ustada)</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quranic recital groups/religious gatherings</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and magazines</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, please specify</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![FIGURE 7](image)

**RELIGION**

**YOUNG MUSLIMS ARE BROUGHT UP WITH A STRONG BELIEF IN GOD AS A MOST IMPORTANT AND OBLIGATORY FACT.**

In the last few decades the idea that Malaysia is an “Islamic state” has gained much currency. This was not always so: Whilst the first and third Prime Ministers – Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra and Tun Hussein Onn respectively – openly declared that Malaysia was a secular state with Islam as the official religion – the fourth Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad declared that Malaysia was an Islamic state. This correlates with the strong support for the premiership of Tun Abdullah Badawi in 2004. Although he was not as authoritarian a leader as his predecessor Tun Mahathir, he was from a religiously conservative family, had studied theology and been an Imam himself.

Despite some semantic confusion in the difference between “official religion” and “state religion”, further compounded by the fact that Malaysia is a federation of states in which Islam may or may not be the state religion, the federal constitution makes it clear that the Rulers (i.e. Sultans) are Heads of Islam in their respective states. The eighteen point agreement states that is was one of Sabah’s conditions on entering the “Malaysia Agreement” that there would be no state religion. Therefore, perceptions of religious laws are bound to differ from state to state. However, the breakdown of the findings in this survey does not reveal differences that go beyond the distinction of East and West Malaysia.

Muslims in Malaysia obtain their religious instruction from a wide variety of sources – at home from their parents and siblings; in school from agama (=religion) classes, school assemblies, Muslim teachers and friends; from radio, television, the internet; from the Quran itself has not changed, interpretations have changed and are changing. What was the impact of this? The youth is more religious than their parents. 55.6% would opt for a more religious upbringing of their own children; among those there are more males than females, and more professionals, employers or managers than those of lower occupational status. As the level of education increases, the percentage of those intending a more religious upbringing for their own children also increases. It seems that their heightened consciousness may have created the need to adhere more strictly to their religious practices and attitudes.

Indeed, a “local teacher” or “parent” represents the majority of answers to “From where did you know about Islam?”, this implies that different interpretations could have taken root, which freely agrees with the historical development of Islam, in the sense that while the Quran itself has not changed, interpretations have changed and are changing.

![FIGURE 7](image)
From a young age at home, in school and in their social and religious surroundings, Muslims are brought up with a strong belief in God as a most important and obligatory ‘fact’. The coexistence of other religions has always been tolerated in Malaysia. Becoming better Muslims is what good Muslims should always aspire to do. Almost naturally, Muslim youths consider these two perceptions and concepts as utterly important for themselves. 88.2% of Muslim youths are brought up in homes that they consider very or rather religious. Few are brought up in homes that they consider less religious (9.2%) or non-religious (2.4%).

In spite of the religiosity in their homes and half of the youths attending religious schools, some are rather relaxed about their daily obligations such as praying and reading the Quran: just 28.7% always pray five times a day.

Just 18.1% read the Quran often, 8.6% never do so and the rest of them read it sometimes. Their low understanding of the Quranic verses could be a factor for the rather low reading rate which necessitates the knowledge of Arabic, which is taught at rather low proficiency levels in High School. Only 0.9% of youths understand all the verses and 11.7% understand most of them, while the vast majority (78.4%) understand rather little. Age makes little difference to their ability to understand the Quran. Rural youths appear to experience more difficulties than urban youths.

Less than two thirds of the Muslim youths always fast during Ramadan. The rest does not always do so, even though it is compulsory for Muslims to fast during Ramadan and punishment is possible for those caught breaking this obligation without good reason. More females than males comply. The few (0.2%) who never fast during Ramadan are all males.

In Malaysia, women began to wear headscarves in the 1980s and it became the norm in the last two and a half decades. Today, just 0.5% of the Muslim youth believe that women should not wear a headscarf. 14.8% think it is up to the women to decide and 70% - slightly more males (72.1%) than females (66.6%) - consider wearing headscarves to be compulsory. The higher their educational level, the more respondents consider wearing headscarves compulsory (81.3% of university graduates). This might be a result of tertiary educational institutions exerting a strong peer pressure on their students to follow suit. There is little difference in the percentage between urban and rural youths who think wearing headscarves is compulsory for females.

It is important here to note shifts in such dominant outward social attitudes. It has often been remarked that movies produced in the 50s, which often featured Muslim women without headscarves, could not be made in a similar manner today. Back then, the late film director Tan Sri P. Ramlee, who tackled social issues such as competing value systems was revered equally by all Malaysian ethnic groups.

More than 70% - among them slightly more males than females - want the Quran to replace the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Muslims in Sabah and Sarawak less so; only half of them want the replacement of the Federal Constitution by the Quran. Nationwide, objection to apostasy is almost unanimous at 98.3%. Asked to choose, almost 80% define themselves as Muslims while less than 15% define themselves as Malaysians. 5.5% define themselves according to their ethnicity.

The apparent social conservatism might be a cause of concern amongst observers who support a liberal democratic society. However, it is important to differentiate between social conservatism and support for authoritarianism. At first glance, the answers might suggest widespread support amongst Malaysian Muslim youth for social conservatism. But the apparent preference of Syariah Law over the Federal Constitution may not necessarily indicate unabashed support for the Syariah, but may also reflect great dissatisfaction with the Federal Constitution. It must be remembered that in recent years many books and opinion pieces have mentioned that the Federal Constitution has been amended many times, with many implying that the legal environment has suffered as a result, or giving the impression that the Federal Constitution does not have sufficient inbuilt protections against governments with large majorities.

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Communication technology is very important for young people. Their mobile phones, smart-phones, i-pads and laptops enable them to keep in touch with their friends and provide entertainment through music and games. Gadgets are trendy and a significant part of youth culture; they seem to have become necessary to many Muslim youths. Technology is even more important to rural youths and equally important to various age groups and on different levels of education.

Aspiring to become rich or not - 60% of the respondents consider wearing designer clothes as 'in'. The younger youths (more than 17 years) are more interested in such trends than older youths. Technology is – and has always been – very important for young people. Their mobile phones, smart-phones, i-pads and laptops enable them to keep in touch with their friends and provide entertainment through music and games. Gadgets are trendy and a significant part of youth culture; they seem to have become necessities to many Muslim youths. Technology is even more important to rural youths and equally important to various age groups and on different levels of education.

When you are stressed, what do you do about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>First rank</th>
<th>Second rank</th>
<th>Third rank</th>
<th>Fourth rank</th>
<th>Fifth rank</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watching TV</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to music</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surfing the internet</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading books, magazines or newspapers</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sightseeing</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing something together with the family</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise/ sport</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting people</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping, buying things for yourself</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching videos/ dvds</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing playstation, nintendo or computer games</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to the mosque</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to the pub/Café/Mamak</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being involved in a group, a project or an organization</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing something creative or artistic</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to the public/human stall</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making a youth movie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to disco, parties or clubbing</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, mention</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This allocation of down-time clashes with the youths’ statement that “becoming a better Muslim” is their second most important aspiration in life. “Belief in God”, they state, is most important to them, “to have friends” less so, “to become rich” ranks last. Aspiring to become rich or not - 60% of the respondents consider wearing designer clothes as ‘in’. The younger youths (more than 17 years) are more interested in such trends than older youths.

Youths like everyone else encounter problems, frustrations and stress in their daily lives. The management of emotions, especially stress, has an influential impact on their mental and physical health. How youths handle stress is therefore important. Telling a friend is most commonly used but there are some gender differences. Female youths, being more communicative, also tell family members their problems while male youths, being either less verbal or having to appear more stoic, tend to use escapism such as letting the stress go away on its own or listening to music for relaxation. Hardly any (0.9%) males and females say that they are using sedatives or drugs.
In consequence it might be deduced that the cultural preference of Malaysian Muslim Youth is largely shaped by (indeed highly-controlled) broadcast media, local religious teachers and parents along with, perhaps to a lesser extent, social interaction with their peers or other autonomous social groupings. In addition, almost 85% use the internet, taking youngsters beyond borders, exposing them to different cultures, views and value-systems. This might explain the simultaneous presence of a strong minority (40.7%) who feel that “the western music, movies and clothes are cooler than ours”.

A good measure of the Muslim youths’ social outlook may therefore be what they themselves consider “in” and “out” for the youth today, which arguably may reflect the respondents’ reading of the objective reality and what their peers actually think rather than their own subjective values.

While there is a near consensus to see “communication technology”, “university education” and “success in career” as “in”, the respondents differ substantially on whether “self-employment”, “marriage”, “political involvement”, “designer clothes”, “European Union”, “healthy food” and “taking drugs” are supposed to be “in” or “out”. There is an almost even split over “faithfulness” and “taking responsibility for others” as being “in” or “out”. Interestingly, more than a third of the respondents feel that taking drugs is “in” while less than 1% say that they are taking drugs themselves.

Some Muslim youths are involved in civil society. While nearly three quarters of the respondents claim to be “active in groups, in an office or function at school, college or university” only about one in four are reportedly active in youth organizations, NGOs, clubs or societies. The reported participation in political parties stands at 14.2%.

POLITICS

THREE QUARTERS OF THE MALAYSIAN MUSLIM YOUTHS DECLARE THAT THEY HAVE LITTLE OR NO INTEREST IN POLITICS.

Distance from politics can be derived from their apathy towards exercising their voting rights. Of those eligible for voting, as many as 66.3% have not registered as voters, and another 20.0% have never voted in spite of having their names registered on the electoral lists. Whereas females are more conscious in exercising their voting rights than males, it is employers, managers, non-office workers and the unemployed who are the most apathetic towards registering to vote.
The aversion of the government towards students’ political activities certainly stifles young people’s interest in politics, except for those who are intrinsically compassionate about democracy and justice. Consequently, for the majority of them—a particularly the youths in Sabah and Sarawak—getting involved in politics is not at all “cool.” Older respondents with the highest education show the least appreciation for involvement in politics.

Most Muslim youths share the belief that “a strong man should bring order to our country.” People’s power is, however, generally acknowledged as such: 73.7% believe that people have the power to change a government that they don’t like, 71.4% feel that a good democracy needs opposition parties. More than two thirds are convinced that women could become good leaders of the country.

Relative political apathy may pose questions about the Muslim youths’ commitment to democracy. Four related issues can provide some possible answers: the youths’ attitude towards violence in society, their specification of politicians as religious or secular authorities, freedom of speech and the question of leadership.

On a scale of 1 (not true at all) to 10 (absolutely true) the notion that there are problems in every society which can only be solved by violence scores low (4.4). Most young people believe that violence can and should be avoided. The idea that politicians should be replaced by clergymen to run the country is acceptable for many (6.1). Almost all believe that people should be free to speak up and to demonstrate their convictions without fear (8.2).

Democratic attitudes are nourished on an elementary basis among youngsters, but their answers show that decades of authoritative government have left their mark. Moreover, it needs to be considered that Muslim youths have acquired their political knowledge largely through the conventional media which are controlled by the ruling coalition of Barisan Nasional (National Front): television is the top source of information (30.4%), followed by radio (23.1%), newspapers (12.1%), internet (9.7%), school (8.0%) and people around them (16.6%). And yet, the most recent (2008) general election in Malaysia has given credible testimony to the strength of Muslim youth at tertiary age level could be due to the Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971 that prohibits active participation of tertiary students in political activities. Individual students can join the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students which holds motivational and tutoring classes for students or they can individually join the Peninsular Malaysia for Malay Students Federation which assists Malay students in pursuing academic excellence. Students’ associations, however, cannot be affiliated to any of these two associations.
## CONCLUSION

The survey findings show many contradictory statements and they are full of ambivalences.

While taking a very conservative stand on religious and moral issues, Malaysia’s Muslim youths are not rigorous in fulfilling their religious obligations such as praying five times a day, reading the Quran or fasting during Ramadan. While stating that belief in God and becoming a better Muslim are most important in their lives, they rather watch television, listen to music or surf the internet in their leisure time than go to a mosque.

While highly appreciating their parents and turning to them for guidance, Muslim youths feel like they do get their way at the end of the day, indicating that they make their own decisions more often than not.

While stating that they have little interest in politics, Malaysia’s Muslim youths believe in “Peoples’ Power”: They do regard opposition parties as an integral part of a democracy and value freedom of expression and assembly.

Though Malaysia’s Muslim youths regard Osama bin Laden as a freedom fighter (62.4% of the respondents), they denounce violence. It is important to consider that growing up in Malaysia, Muslim youths are constantly reminded of what they need to do and how to be good Muslims by parents, religious leaders, government-controlled media, teachers and others. In addition, youngsters face peer pressure from social groups they are part of in schools, universities or workplaces. At the same time, Malaysia’s Muslim youth lives in and embraces a globalized world. Modern technology – readily available and unrestricted in Malaysia – has become a significant part of youth culture. Almost 85% of young people use the internet, taking youngsters beyond borders and exposing them to different cultures, views and value-systems.

Focusing on single questions and answers, many of the survey results – particularly the apparent social conservatism – might be a cause of concern amongst observers who support a liberal democratic society. However, it is important to consider all questions and answers. Malaysia’s Muslim youths are socially more diverse than meets the eye. Taken as a whole, the findings show both authoritatively conservative and liberally democratic trends among Muslim youngsters – which may possibly be due to the obvious juxtaposition of pressure and freedom young Muslims grow up with in Malaysia.

The character of the schools the Muslim youths attend do not seem to have much impact on them since there are hardly any differences to be noticed in lifestyle and values between those who attend religious and those who attend non-religious schools.

Rural youths seem to be politically more discerning, even though the survey shows very little difference between rural and urban results in general. Historically, all but a few Malay Muslims of the aristocratic classes would have lived in cities, apart from the merchant classes who might have resided in port towns. For the majority of Malay Muslims however, the phenomenon of urban living is not much older than the nation itself.

### COUNTRY REPORT: MALAYSIA

Though female Muslim youths are more conscientious in exercising their voting rights than their male peers, they are less knowledgeable of politics and democracy, such knowledge increases in general with age and level of education.

While, again, three quarters of the Malaysian Muslim youths declare that they have little or no interest in politics, when asked about specific domestic and international issues, most respondents are in fact concerned.

---

**TABLE 25**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Concerned (%)</th>
<th>Not concerned (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know / No answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A - A serious disease, such as cancer or AIDS</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B - Too many immigrants and refugees in this country</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C - Human right abuses by the state</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 26**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know / No answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A - The US invasion of Afghanistan was justified</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B - Terrorism gives Islam a bad name</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C - Osama bin Laden is a freedom fighter</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D - As soon as the Israel-Palestine conflict is solved, there will be peace in the world</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
52.1% of the questioned youths attended a religious school.

The data collection for this survey was carried out from October 21st until November 4th, 2010 by the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research. 1,060 Malaysian citizens aged between 15 and 25 years were questioned.

The sample was selected randomly from households across Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, in proportion with updated Malaysian Census tables published in 2003.

Within the localities, households were chosen using a 5-household skip pattern – i.e. every 6th household is sampled. Each interviewer was to continue visiting every 6th household until his or her quota (that responds to the pre-determined demographic characteristics) was achieved.

The respondents were interviewed face to face by trained interviewers.

Slightly about 23.8% of the respondents were inspected and their feedback obtained through direct observation of the supervisors and verifiers, post-survey in person inspection and telephone calls for quality control purposes.

68.5% of the questioned youths are senior high school graduates.
Youth, defined to cover the ages of 15 to 25 years, is a period of high energy and enthusiasm, coupled with idealism and invincibility. Success of our youth need to be properly nurtured and harnessed as they are the up-and-coming workforce and the next echelon of leaders. The environment and society in which youth grow up have a very significant impact on how they utilise their talents, strengths, energy and idealism.

The milieu of youth in Malaysia, their home environment, the media, education, government policies and societal values all have a profound effect on shaping them. Since they grew up in the post-independence era of Malaysia, today's youth are brought up in a period of rapid economic growth and modernisation, fast changing technologies, globalisation, changing family structure and rising individualism. In addition, though the print and electronic media, they are exposed to the rise of religious fundamentalism, the conflict between Palestine and Israel and tensions between Muslim and Western developed countries. These surroundings and knowledge influence the lifestyle, values, beliefs and affiliations of Muslim parents in Malaysia. This article attempts to look to the context of the personal development, family orientation, religious beliefs, values and attitudes towards social environment and politics of Muslim youth in Malaysia based on a recent survey of Muslim youth and is seen from a socio-psychological perspective.

**PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Muslim youth in Malaysia are generally a happy and contented group of people who are rather optimistic about their future and the future of Malaysia, notwithstanding that some of them do feel gloomy at times. Their happiness is understandable as they have not suffered hardships on a major scale. Malaysia is generally politically stable, economically sound—though it has its share of economic downturns—and, importantly, it has not suffered any devastating natural calamities. Education up to tertiary level is accessible to the vast majority. Besides education, the government provides quality healthcare and sport facilities to its citizens.

The importance of getting quality education is acknowledged as it is just below the first-ranked item, "living in a safe neighborhood". On a scale of 10 how important education is, more than 70% gave 9 or 10 for getting quality education. More females consider getting quality education important and this could account for the higher percentage of females in tertiary education. The higher the educational level of the respondents, the higher is the rating for the importance of getting quality education. More divorced youth than singles or still married youth rank getting quality education important. But many non-office supervisors do not share the same sentiments. The percentage of them perceiving quality education important as an occupation is well below the percentage in those other occupations, such as executive/manager-executives in offices, professionals, non-office supervisors and even non-office workers. Parents and the non-office supervisors see quality education having little relevance to their work, success and promotion.

**FAMILY ORIENTATION**

Muslim youth consider marrying and having children as important, with more males than females having this view and it becomes increasingly important with age. Overwhelmingly, the youth believe that a person with a family is happier. This belief of the family life being an impetus of happiness is due to the good relationship and the security they feel. The positive influence on the family life along splendidly with their families and they do not often have differing opinions. Their parents care for them and give them guidance. They also indicate that their parents always tell them what to do and this does not seem to bother them. This attitude of acceptance from their parents may be due to the practice of revering older people.

The relationship with their parents is good, only 24% would raise their wages more than their parents and 9.5% would be more religious, 2.5% less religious, 20% more would be stricter while 15.9% would be more lovelorn. More males than females want to be more religious children and more Malays than Bumiputra in Sabah and Sarawak. Among types of occupations, professional and those who are employers/ in management or owners of more than 10 employees, more than 90% of the males want a more religious upbringing for their children. In addition, as the level of education increases, the percentage of those wanting this type of upbringing of their children also increases. What is the reason for better educated and more successful Muslim youth to have this attitude towards the upbringing of their children?

The heightened consciousness of their religious beliefs may have created in them the need to adhere more strictly to their religious practices and obligations. Women in Malaysia in general begin to wear headscarves in the 1980s and it became the norm in the last two and a half decades. Only quite recently have girls in primary school worn headscarves and young boys worn long pants.

In keeping with the trend of their day, their parents or grandparents might have practised family planning and opted for smaller families. Present day youth are unlikely to follow their parents or grandparents as none of the respondents plan to have more than one child and more than half of them want to have more than two children. This is probably in keeping with their religious belief of letting destiny determine the number of children.

**RELIGION**

In Malaysia, Muslims obtain their religious instruction from a wide variety of sources: at home from their parents and siblings; in school from agama classes; school assemblies, Mosque teachers and friends; from radio, television, the internet; from the public daily call to prayer; from print media such as books, magazines and newspapers; and government policies. Muslim youth are brought up to believe that it is their duty and responsibility to be "in". Technology is equally important to youth in the various age groups and the different levels of education.

Typifying how youth in rural areas spend their leisure time is difficult. But the mobile phone is definitely a part of their lifestyle, even more so among rural youth. Mobile phone ownership and gaming are not popular even among them. The majority of university students and rural youth who use the internet do not come near to it. These surveys in Malaysia and Indonesia do not study rural youth. The majority of rural youth do not even have access to the internet.

**SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT, LIFESTYLE AND VALUES**

It is a common sight to see popular cafes, shopping complexes, mamak stalls and sidewalks to be full of young people during weekends, holidays and in the evenings. Mobile phones are their constant companion whether they are at work or enjoying their homeenvironment. Technology is equally important to youth in the various age groups and the different levels of education.

Reading books is not a very popular pastime among Malaysians though reading magazines and newspapers is. Though more of those with a university education read as a pastime, reading is not popular among those without this education. More university graduates watch television although the percentage of them that engage in this activity is lower than the groups with a lower education level. Such a popular television is such a compelling leisure activity that the other activities do not come near to it. Except for listening to music and surfing the internet, the other activities have less than 2% of the respondents engaging in them.


despite the religiosity in their homes and school, more than 70% of them want the Quran to be obligatory; becoming better Muslims is what they want to do and how to be a good Muslim.

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Muslim youth are brought up in homes which are very religious (42.4%) or rather religious (45.8%). Only 2.4% of them are brought up in a non-religious home and 9.2% in homes that are less religious. Despite the religiosity in their homes and school, 78.4% admit to attending the recitation of the Quran verses daily while 78.4% admit to understanding rather little and 11.7% rather much. Age makes little difference to their ability in understanding the Quran but rural youth appear to experience more difficulty.

Generally, Muslim youth fast during Ramadan – either always (64.2%) or often (15.8%). Though it is compulsory for Muslims to fast during Ramadan and they will be punished if they find to break this obligation, 0.2% admit that they have not fasted and 12.2% fast sometimes. More females comply with this obligation and those who never fast during Ramadan are males.

Though many Muslim youth do not practise their religious obligations, such as praying and reading the Quran, almost 70% of them want the headscarf to be compulsory for women. More males (72.1%) compared with females (66.6%) want this regulation. It is surprising that those with a secondary degree (66.9%) are more liberal than those with a degree (83.1%) or with diploma or its equivalent (73.0%). There is little difference in the percentage between urban and rural youth who want wearing headscarf to be compulsory for females.

Despite the laxity of many Muslim youth in fulfilling their religious obligations, they display a preference for Syariah and Hudud laws. More than 70% of them want the Quran to replace the Federal Constitution. Muslims in Sabah and Sarawak are less keen for the Syariah laws; only half of them want the replacement of the Federal Constitution with the Quran. A slightly higher percentage of males, compared with females are in favour of Syariah laws.
them for leisure. This includes going to the mosque even for those attending religious schools.

Technology broadens a youngster’s knowledge and this applies to youth in other countries as well. This knowledge, coupled with psychologically enticing advertising, whets their appetite for luxurious and branded items. Possessing designer clothes, shoes and accessories is a status symbol. Muslim youth have the same need as more than 60% of the respondents consider designer clothing to be cool. The influence of television on their values, attitudes and lifestyle must be rather great since they spend so much of their leisure time watching it. Parents and families are important to them but their influence may not be as strong as shown by their failure to fulfil their religious obligations even in very religious homes. Schools too do not seem to make much impact on these youth since there are hardly any differences in lifestyle and values between those who attend religious schools and those who attend non-religious schools.

CONCLUSION

Malaysia is a Muslim majority country with about 60.4 per cent of its 28 million total population (2010) being Muslim. The largest group within the Malaysian category is ethnic Malay. It constitutes 50.4 per cent of the total population. Other Muslim natives are the Bajau, the Orang Asli, the Sarawak, the Dayaks of Sarawak and the Orang Ulu. Other Muslims constitute 20.5 per cent of the total population (10.3 per cent of whom are of Chinese origin). These Muslims are known as the non-Malays. A smaller number are Chinese (converts and Muslim-born), Indian (Muslim-born and converts) and expatriates.

The exact statistics of youths—those between 15-25 years—in Malaysia, Muslims and non-Muslims, is not available; however, official statistics indicate that those in the 15-64 year-old category constitute 68 per cent of the population. From this figure it has been extrapolated that the size of those between 15-25 years old is about 40 per cent of the total population (about 11.2 million). How many per cent of these are Muslims and non-Muslims? No one has really tried to count.

If the ‘guesserite’ is correct, then the number of young Muslims and non-Muslims, between 15-25 years old, is about 11.2 million. This makes up a very large section of the total population. If 50 per cent of the total youth population is Muslim, which is then 5.6 million, it means Muslim youth is a rather large and potentially influential group in the Malaysian context, especially in the political arena. With the current ‘democratic’ political upheavals in traditionally religious nation like Malaysia, the youth is a likely force that finally achieved what Ben Laden has failed to do, namely, the ‘Sanhazanah’ of the societies in the Middle East and North Africa. In short, there was a brief period of switching-off of Islamophobia, but now it seems to be switched-on again!

In these unexpected global circumstances, with the Muslim youth at centre stage, it appears that discussing the results of a nation-wide survey on Malay-Muslim youths in Malaysia conducted by the Malaysian Merdeka Center on behalf of the Centre for Freedom in October and November of 2010 – is timely and indeed relevant. Perhaps, before interpreting the results from the survey, a brief analysis on Malaysia, as a society, is in order. It may provide a perspective within which the findings ought to be read and understood.

MALAYSIA: MANAGING AND SUSTAINING A SOCIAL COHESION

Everyone knows that Malaysia has many ethnic groups of various religious, linguistic and cultural backgrounds and that Malaysians are always striving to survive in one peaceful nation. This is the most striking and positive feature of Malaysian society in the last 40 years or so. It is very clear that in Malaysia, violence is not an option.

Malaysians will no doubt continue in the future to discuss openly in or in private matters concerning their personal ethnic woes, intra- and inter-ethnic difficulties, in the search for a middle ground in order to safeguard their lifestyles and allow them to continue to enjoy the quality of life the country is blessed with.

They also accept the fact that they do need to conduct continuous public discourse on matters they are unhappy about rather than keeping them within, which in turn, remind them that they are living in a state of ‘social cohesion’ but not without conflict, contradiction and contestation. Therefore Malaysians work very hard to maintain peace and stability in the country hence Malaysia’s well-known capacity at social sustainability.

Like citizens in many other countries that have embarked on the modernization project, Malaysians have to remind themselves of the fact that there are two major components in such an endeavour, namely, economic and political factors. Finding and maintaining a peace between them is the both a necessity and also the greatest challenge.

To measure the success of the economic component is relatively easy. Growth figures help us to ascertain where we are heading and what they are indicating. The thriving of the other component, however, is not so easy. Growth figures help us to ascertain where we are heading but they do not indicate the economic spread, even or uneven. The thriving of the other component is the both a necessity and also the greatest challenge.

The concept of Malays in Malaysia has become more culturally-defined, hence it is an ‘ethnic group’, as a result of the introduction, since 31 August 1957, of Article 160 of the Constitution of Malaysia as a cultural and political concept. The concept of Malays in Malaysia has become more culturally-defined, hence it is an ‘ethnic group’, as a result of the introduction, since 31 August 1957, of Article 160 of the Constitution of Malaysia as a cultural and political concept.

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However, to achieve the political target of nation-building, by realizing national integration, to be conducted through the implementation of various national policies -- in the fields of education, language and culture -- is not an easy task. In fact, the exercise of nation-building, on the whole, is a nebulous one. The measurement of its progress is equally an imprecise one. In 1991, Malaysia’s former Prime Minister, Tun Mahathir Mohamad, in his character as an aspiring creator of a united Malaysia nation, or Bangsa Melayu, in his famous ‘Vision 2020’ statement, with this, he clearly implies that there exists in Malaysia a thriving ‘state’ but not yet a ‘nation’; which he hopes could be accomplished by the year 2020.

When proposing his Vision 2020, he must have realized that Malaysians are still saddled with a number of historical-social-cultural impediments in the nation-building process, be they in the form of economic spheres or in Malaysia’s modern electoral system. Perhaps the only useful method for measuring Malaysia’s success in nation-building, obviously in addition to its economic achievements, is to compare its overall performance with that of other multi-ethnic countries which were once considered to be success stories, such as Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.

That Malaysia have been perceived as a model of success by the developing countries, sufficient for them to have confidence in selecting to play the leading role as the Chair for NAM (Non-Aligned Movement which has 118 member countries), OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference which has 57 member countries) and ASEAN (Association Southeast Asian Nations which has 10 member countries), speaks volumes for its achievement.

It is important to remember that “unity is not uniformity.” Total unity and uniformity, in Malaysia’s case, would be tantamount to racial, linguistic, cultural, religious or other differences that exist in Malaysia. Crying for their absence could mislead others and would generate alienating, indeed, violent atomic consequences that must be avoided at all cost. Malaysia has to live and have lived successfully with their differences for decades, even if the situation is not completely perfect.

However, to maintain ethnic harmony at any cost is not an easy task. To ignore this is to invite unfathomable difficulties and dire consequences, such as what we witnessed in the black events of May 13, 1969. Perhaps it is against such a background that the government has recently made the effort to introduce ‘integration’ and to narrow the gap between us and our students at institutions of higher learning. This program may not create national integration and ethnic unity overnight but it is a task. To ignore this is to invite unfathomable difficulties and dire consequences, and these factors shaped and influenced their social world and in the long-run how the Malay-Muslim youths shaped some parts of the larger social life realm of Malaysia. The result of the survey is a small window for us to get some glimpses of contemporary Malay-Muslim youths in Malaysia.

THE ‘GENERATION GAP’ THESIS

Based on a random survey of the discourse and debate, in the last decade, on Muslims in Europe, Asia, and North America, there seems to be a convergence of opinions, direct or indirect and expressed or assumed, in how to frame the analysis on Muslim youths, namely, the oft-repeated ‘generation gap’ thesis. It is suggested that on the one side there are two social categories, namely, the first generation, the ‘older ones’ (grandparents and great-grandparents) who are traditional and religious as a result of upbringing, including being educated in the religious school system. The second group, are the not-so-old-and-not-so-young group (father and mother generation) who have religious education but worked in the modern secular sector. Others pursued further education in the modern secular schools and achieved high status and accumulated substantial material wealth as a result of working in the private and public sector.

On the other, there is only one social category, namely, ‘younger ones’ (grandchildren), who are totally modern and secular in their educational upbringing embellished with a lot of little religious teachings, but at the same time they have some basic Islamic rituals, and a rather superficial knowledge about Islam. Often they subscribe to universal moral values such as human rights, civil society, justice and equality. Some from this category experienced ‘religious awakening’ and ‘returned’ to Islam, and became involved in the dakwah or Islamic revitalization movement while they were receiving secular education. The majority of these students have specialized in the field of physical sciences. It is not a coincidence that other radical groups around the world have been led by such young scientists, too.

There is a complex relationship between the two divided sections within which those in the category ‘younger ones’ have greater access to non-Islamic influences, and are more prone to conflict and contestation and at other times by consensus and compromise. This ambivalent relationship has often resulted in division and distrust between those in this category and the two older groups.

It has been argued by many who wrote on Muslim youths that ‘secularization of human society’ has underpinned the ‘de-Islamization’ process (to borrow Syed Nafis Al-Attar’s concept) experienced by the youths. This so-called ‘deculturation experience brought them face to face with the ultracons and their older generations, both embracing different and opposing values, hence the ‘generation gap’ thesis.

One factor that has been singled out by many analysts, East and West, as most influential in the secularization of human society vis-a-vis the Muslim youths has been technological development which has been dominated by rational-scientific principles apparently without the guidance of any metaphysical values. Such technological advancement has provided the Muslim youths with an incredible amount of knowledge and information that the parents and grandparents do not possess. In other words, the grandparents and parents can no longer provide the moral guidance and advice to their younger ones.

The ‘generation gap’ thesis therefore suggests that the secular system has broken down the religion-based traditional familial, patriarchal and religiousized educational experience, thereby weakening the parent-mentee relationship thus distancing the latter from the former. The so-called ‘moral panic’, of the old over the ‘negative’ pattern beyond the young, that has consequently emerged, has been explained in the ‘generation gap’ thesis.

The most point is if this gap can ever be closed or made to disappear. Or, if positing the relationship in a binary opposition is the best analytical frame there is. Or, if such perspective has been influenced by the ‘theological imagination’, his divide between the ‘good vs. evil’, ‘black vs. white’ and so on.

Is it not more beneficial analytically to look at this relationship within a framework of a continuum, whereby the older generation is at the one end of the continuum and the younger ones at the other; and the parents are in the middle, connecting and mediating between the two generations? In my opinion, adopting a ‘continuum frame’ as an analytical tool would require a more complex perspective, in order to better understand the cohesions aspects of the relationship, within which conflict and contestation occur. The binary opposition principle that underpins the ‘generation gap’ thesis seems to over-emphasize the conflict side of the relationship at the expense of the positive side of the relationship. Perhaps the Malaysian case can provide some fresh answers.

In some aspects this gives us the impression that the ‘generation gap’ thesis has some validity in the context of Malaysian Muslim youths, epistemologically, in the sense that the overwhelming secular experience and existence has made them technologically savvy. However, they are not totally de-Islamized as the gap thesis would suggest. They may be superficial in the practice of Islam and knowledge about Islam but, they are concentrating mainly on the rituals without possessing real deep theological knowledge, they nevertheless perceive of their strict moral upbringing, their secular experience of information that the parents and grandparents do not possess. The faith in the religion is strong and having that as a compass in their life is important. Although they seem to believe that they are more materialistic, creative, hardworking and ambitious than their older generation, they remain steadfastly holding the ultimate value of believing in God. It is not surprising therefore that success and failure in life, in their view, is determined by fate. However, they are prepared to learn something new, to have fun in life and push their will through to achieve their ambition. In short, in terms of ethics and ethos, their relative position is at the top of their list, as opposed to emphasizing religious activities and duties, which they believe were on top of their parent’s list.

Their notion and practice of sexuality is very mainstream: no pre-marital sex, no gays and lesbians, no bikinis or tank tops. Nonetheless, their relationship with their parents remains good from when they were much younger until at present.

The MALAYSIAN CASE

Against the background narrative presented above, the survey conducted in selected Muslim youths across Peninsular Malaysia (83.3% of the sample) and East Malaysia (16.7% of the sample), can only provide us, at best, with some useful insights on the Malaysian Muslim youths in the country. It definitely updates us with what is happening in Malaysian vis-a-vis its Muslim youths based on data collected from an empirical survey and not some popular extrapolation, which tends to be a common practice among NGOs, political parties (both in the ruling coalition and the opposition coalition), and the soldiers of mass media, the internet, electronic tools and print.

The survey suggests that the Muslim youths, at the level of personal development and lifestyle, are more inclined towards personal-based piety orientation in their overall religious outlook and practice. Seldom do they choose to be involved in a collective-based religious political activism. They definitely show a great liking towards technology, especially the new media (internet and sms), and they are also inclined to study technical subjects in universities. For entertainment they listen to music (modern and religious) and watch Western movies. They strive hard to improve their personal well-being and in their effort they seek jobs with good income.

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They want to have a normal family, to get married and have children, more than two if possible. Marriage is viewed as a yardstick of a leader. If their spouse-to-be is a non-Muslim, they want them to convert to Islam. However, they are divided whether, on the one hand, they should raise their children with a lot more religious components or, on the other, if they should let their children grow up like they did. All in all, they want to be a good parent.

The rather interesting finding from this survey is that overall, in terms of religious intensity and orientation, the group of the respondents cannot be categorized as extremist or fundamentalist. They have information and some knowledge about Islam. They have gone through learning to read the Quran, learning to fast and learning the rituals from their ustaz (religious teachers).

Nearly half of them (42.4%) grew up socialized by very religious parents but they turned out to be moderate ones. Remarkably, more than 60% have not seen or experienced violence in the last 12 months before the survey was conducted. They heard about the rules with regards to wearing headscarves, Hudud laws, cutting off hands of thieves, and caning for Muslims who drink beer but not even mentioned any Quranic verses that support such rules.

Beyond the personal and family related context the youths overwhelmingly (92%) expressed their willingness to engage in some form of social activities that relate to the environment and animals. They also showed that they have not only the poor and the aged. They are also concerned about preservation of culture and heritage and want to be involved in its preservation activities. They prefer the social engagement at the place where they study, and working with peers is high on their list. However, involving themselves in political activities is not high on their agenda, and only 73% of them are interested in change. In short, the findings reveal that the respondents only moderately participate and engage in social organizations.

The political position adopted by the respondents is a consistent one. They may not be very interested in politics but appreciate good leadership in the country. Of course, they are very aware of what is happening in Malaysia, socio-politically and in economic terms. Indeed, they express appreciation and satisfaction regarding the economic growth, political stability, good infrastructures and satisfactory governance. They wish the social problems relating to the youths could be tackled and resolved. However, only 44% of the respondents expressed the highest level of satisfaction with the peaceful situation in Malaysia. This is clearly reflected in their preference for a safe neighborhood.

They definitely expressed an optimistic viewpoint about Malaysia by saying (90%) that they are happy with life - some also think that being an entrepreneur is a good aspiration.

Of course, they were not asked about their reaction to Osama Ben Laden’s demise. But they do express a strong pro-Muslim worldview when it comes to international politics. Even President Obama of the USA, according to them, cannot resolve the Muslim problems in the world, such as the Palestinian issue which is very high on their list of concerns. However, some consider globalization a positive phenomenon which they identified with peace, economic prosperity and technological advancement. Others thought that globalization has brought negative impacts such as the destruction of the environment. They are concerned too about issues, such as cancer and AIDS, loss of traditional values and culture, and losing jobs or not being able to find and keep employment.

CONCLUSION

The survey provides sufficient findings for observers to support the impression that Malaysia is definitely not a failed state8 as some people would like us to believe, nor is Malaysia a little Afghanistan with Taliban-like extremists running around eking out a living from growing poppies; and, Malaysia is not suffering from an ethnic strife of a magnitude which Sri Lanka had experienced for more than two decades.

The social context within which the youths have expressed their opinions on a range of critical matters in their life and environment could only be the Malaysian context in articulating the experience of social cohesion that Malaysia has enjoyed. The moderation of Islamic life has created moderate viewpoints amongst the Muslim youths interviewed. Interestingly, in spite of the active involvement of the youths in bringing about political change in Malaysia, this group has also expressed happiness with the government. Could the forces of change have been motivated by non-Muslims? Or Muslim elites interested in the moderation of Islamic life has created moderate viewpoints amongst the Muslims?

There is no sign that violence is an option in the minds of these respondents, and certainly not amongst the majority of respondents. Even against the backdrop of the killing of 51 Sri Lankan Tamils, the situation has not been changed. The apparent preference of Syariah Law over the Federal Constitution does not have sufficient inbuilt protections. The respondents show no sign of inter-religious disquiet or anxiety in spite of the fact that many such issues have been raised publicly in the media.

The social sustainability of Malaysia is certainly the result of a combination of factors, that include relatively peaceful inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations and prosperous economic existence. This, however, does not mean that there is no absence of conflict and contestation. It is significant to note, however, that whatever conflict and contestation has happened it was always balanced by negotiation, consensus and compromise. This may be difficult to believe and understand because even in developed nations multiculturalism does not seem to work, and yet: Malaysians breathe and live multiculturalism!9

The apparent preference for Syariah Law over the Federal Constitution (Question 60) may not necessarily indicate unbalanced support for the Federal Constitution, but may also reflect dissatisfaction with the Federal Constitution. In recent years, many books and opinion pieces have decried the fact that the Federal Constitution has been amended many times, with many implying that the general legal environment has suffered as a result, or giving the impression that the Federal Constitution does not have sufficient robust protections. Question 54 (“How often are you able to attend all five daily prayers?”) does not differentiate between those who are not able to attend all five daily prayers of course/ willful negligence and those who are not able to as a result of physical or time constraints.

Question 56 reveals that more than three quarters of respondents admit to understanding “rather little” of the verses of the Quran. This is despite nearly 90% of respondents claiming to be “very religious home” or “rather religious home” (Question 53). Indeed, a “local teacher” or “parents” represent the majority of answers to “From where did you know about Islam?” (Question 47). It can be said that Malaysia has many different interpretations, which does reflect the historical development of Islam in general.

It is important here to note shifts in dominant outward social attitudes. It has often been remarked that movies produced by the likes of the late R. K. Rajan, or performances of the late Sudirman Arshad, would not be able to be made in like manner today. Such juxtapositions abound not only in social life but also in political attitudes towards these views. Indeed, whilst in the 1970s a former prime minister defended the holding of a concert by Sudirman at a public university, today there is very little public political defending of popular performers or arts practitioners, indeed many politicians join the choruses of disapproval when artists deemed to be “sexy” or “immoral” wish to perform in Malaysia. The remit and role of the Film Censorship Board in removing scenes or banning movies it deems unsuitable remains in force.

The widespread use of the headscarf today provides possibly the most visible example of how outward practices have changed. Although no survey data is available, photographs of people in Malaysia in the 1950s and 60s across all social backgrounds and geographic localities – including Rulers’ Consorts, wives of ministers (or female ministers themselves), teachers, nurses and even rural anti-communist militias – rarely include those wearing the tudung as it is used today. In some cases, other uses of the headscarf are of course cultural; and for others it is one of the requirements imposed by religious conservatives today.

Even so, today there are many in prominent positions who do not wear the headscarf. Without further research, it is not possible to be sure how many aspire to do so one day, or are hostile to the idea outright.

Another development is the issuance of fatwa frowning upon or banning certain activities such as yoga and the use of music in dance. Such prominent displays of “establishment” disapproval of these activities may silence or push proponents of such activities underground where they are able to pursue their activities without drawing attention to themselves. There may be examples of young people who rebel more strongly and cease identifying themselves as Muslim altogether.

Another area that is of interest is exploring views about possible dishomologies between what is seen as “Malay culture” and “Islamic values”. This is important given that nearly 80% of respondents defined themselves as “Muslim” rather than their “race” (Question 4). This pan-Malay identity has sometimes been attributed to the after-effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution in addition to domestic factors such as the rural-urban shift of Malay voters.

There are other answers that may have been formed as a response to the perceived rise of social problems. For example,
CONCLUSION
It would be obvious that even without this survey, Malaysia as a Muslim-majority country has changed from the days when Tun Sri Abdul Rahman confidently asserted that his was a secular nation.

However, the results of the survey provide much material to debate why views have formed as they are. It is regrettable that similar surveys have not been conducted on a regular basis (or if they have been, they are not publicly available), for such a wealth of information would surely help inform the story of Islam in Malaysia in illuminating ways. Nonetheless, it is not too late to begin regular surveys such as this, with the caveat that the questions and presentation of data be continually improved to achieve better clarity.

COMMENTS ON THE METHODOLOGY
VAGUENESS OF QUESTIONS
Many of the questions could have been worded in ways that would have enabled much better analysis, or could have been followed by supplementary questions to achieve greater clarity. Question 20 provides one example:

Do you agree or disagree: are Muslims allowed to change their religion?

The first weakness is that it does not define the entity or law that provides or denies the “allowance”. It is possible that while some respondents answered the question based on their knowledge of the federal constitution or state laws and legal precedent, others could have answered based on their understanding of the Syariah, or some other theological or personal moral basis. The answers could have been different if the question demanded the respondent to base the answer on one of these bases.

The second weakness is in simply asking respondents to “agree or disagree” with the (ill-defined) statement. It is entirely possible for someone to “disagree” with the statement based on their understanding of the law, but at the same time feel that the law ought to be changed to enable Muslims to change their religion. A supplementary question asking, “Do you agree that Muslims should be allowed by Malaysian law (the Syariah) to change their religion?” would have achieved this important distinction. At the moment, it is impossible to distinguish between respondents who might have interpreted the question differently.

CONSIDERATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Some categories could have been more refined. For example, no definition is given for what constitutes “urban” or “rural”. A fourth-generation urban resident may have a different outlook to a first generation city-dweller whose family support network remains in the kampung, necessitating frequent trips to rural areas.

DETAILS IN THE TABLE OF FINDINGS
The table of findings could have included more stratification, especially in one area that coincides with legal ramifications as well. The administration of Islam in Malaysia is a state matter, and in fact many enactments regarding religious matters differ from state to state. In Negri Sembilan, for example, there is a legal process for apostasy.

Therefore, perceptions of religious laws may differ from state to state and the omission of this breakdown may have hidden some interesting results.

MORE QUESTIONS
Naturally, with the benefit of hindsight, there are many more questions that could have been asked. One particularly pertinent question might have been:

To what extent do you think Malay culture and tradition clash with Muslim values?
The following analysis will examine five aspects of the Muslim Youth Survey: personal development, family orientation, religion, social environment, lifestyle and politics.

In a background essay (Malaysian Muslim Youth) it will then focus on the social and political aspect of religious authoritarianism amongst Muslim youth in Malaysia.

PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

Malaysian Muslim youth are largely optimistic about themselves and the country. As many as 63.6% believe that they will be able to study or work in their desired field. [Q14] Some 43.1% are rather optimistic about their own future and more (55.6%) are optimistic about the country’s future. On the other hand, 49.8% fluctuate between optimism and pessimism over their own present and future and 34.1% over the country’s future. [Q28 and Q29] However, despite the expression of optimism, 85.2% of the respondents are concerned with the possibility of unemployment. [Q8E]

At a daily level, the youth are most often stressed by interpersonal and social relationships (24.0%), financial difficulties (21.7%), problems at school (9.0%) and health and physical safety (7.8%). [Q24] When stressed, most of them turn to friends or families (41.0%), “let it go on its own” (20.9%) or to music or movies (20.8%) or ask for professional help, while a tiny 1.6% would turn to sedatives, alcohol or drugs. [Q25]

In terms of life goals, a significant percentage of the respondents are economically and career driven, with 41.9% simply wanting to be rich, while others wanting to be entrepreneurs (24.3%), state workers (20.1%) or professional (9.7%). [Q30] Amongst male. [Q15F] Amongst male. [Q15F] Amongst male. [Q15F]

The values of Muslim youth on wealth seem to be somewhat contradicting. While 94.9% believe that hard work would pay off and another 92.9% think they would be able to work hard to earn wealth, a strong minority of 31.7% also believes strongly the lack of preference for son or daughter suggests an appreciation of gender equality in the family. On polygamy, 72.7% of all respondents reject it, with understandably a much higher percentage 85.1% amongst females (as compared to 60.5% amongst males). [Q15F]

The relationship between Muslim youth and their parents must be carefully interpreted as certain answers reflect the social desirability to appear politically correct before the survey than reality. As many as 97.2% claim that “we get along splendidly”, 20.1% also agree that “often we don’t get along well, we often have different opinions”. A careful analysis of all eight questions on parent-child relationships would show only about 47.9% have a complicated but consistent answer: they get along well with their parents and and will turn to their parents when in need, and they believe their parents do care about them and would give them guidance. They believe parents and children would talk and interestingly that “most of the time (the children) will get” their way”. This shows that contemporary Muslim families are perhaps more liberal and democratic than imagined. [Q37A-H]

However, such parenting style does not seem to go down as well with the younger generation. Of those who “get” their way after talking to parents, 30.3% would like to raise their children more religiously and 15.7% more strictly. Of all the respondents, 55.6% would opt for more religious or strict parenting, while another 32.4% would follow their parents’ styles, in contrast with only 20.2% would be more loving, less religious or less strict. This finding suggests that the Muslim youth of tomorrow may be more conservative and authoritarian in outlook than today’s cohort. [Q37H and Q38]

It is important to note that theoretically parenting can be simultaneously democratic and religious, where children are allowed to question religious doctrines and embrace them after critical examination, although we may not find many examples in contemporary Malaysian society. It is therefore important to further investigate in the future what factors contribute to a preference for a more closed parenting style.

RELIGION

Following the rapid Islamisation process since the 1980s, Malaysia is witnessing numerous controversies relating to religious freedom, lifestyle, morality and the role of Islam in policing behaviors. The survey shows that Muslim youth largely support moves to impose religious code and law in public life.

To begin with, objection to apostasy is almost unanimous at 98.3%. [Q20] A slightly lower 92.9% agree or strongly agree with caning as a punishment for Muslims who consume alcohol [Q61A]. Capital punishment for murder, which is mandatory under Common Law, is supported by exactly the same percentage, 92.5%, of Muslim youth. Support suggests it is huge obstacle for any campaign against the death penalty. [Q61B] Even amputation for convicted thieves, a key feature of the Islamic penal code, the hudud laws, which has been ruled out by the Federal Government on constitutional grounds, is supported by a significant 71.9% of youth interviewed. [Q61A]

Also, 69.3% of the respondents believe that Muslim women are duty bound to wear the headscarf. [Q59] Most alarming is that nearly seven out of every ten respondents believe the Qur’anic verse that would replace the Federal Constitution as the highest law of the land. [Q60]

It is important to differentiate between sheer religious conservatism and religiously-infused authoritarianism. A liberal democracy must accept the former as a perfectly legitimate position. There is nothing wrong for the religious pious to believe in restrictions on individual lifestyle as long as they do not resort to the state for coercion. Hence, the 97% support for women to wear the headscarf on whatever grounds should not be seen as alarming.

Meanwhile, “religious authoritarianism” will also have to be cautiously defined and measured. From this survey, a simple 9-point “Religious Authoritarianism Index” is constructed by adding up responses on the questions on caning for alcohol consumption, amputation for theft and the Federal Constitution by the Qur’an. The death penalty, even though highly related, is excluded because it may reflect a cross-confessional attitude. Unsurprisingly, the graph skews rightwards, suggesting no middle ground on the matter. Interestingly, Muslim youth are actually less religious in their practice than outlook. Only 28% of respondents, compared to 38% “We don’t pray five times a day” put their religious beliefs into practice while another 67.9% answer to be doing “often” or “sometimes” instead of “never”. [Q55] Of the total, 78.4% admit that they understand “rather little” the meaning of the verses of the Quran while another 90% claim to not understand “none”. [Q66] Even amongst those who claim to read the Quran often, only slightly more than one third claim that they understand “rather much” or “all of the verses”. [Q67] It is clear the self-reported understanding reflects their actual knowledge or a sense of naiveté.

While as many as 88.0% of them claim to have come from “very” or “rather religious” families, it is not clear if this reflects the demographic reality or a biased sample in the sense that they want to have a religious family. [Q53] What is certain, more than half of the respondents learn about Islam from their local religious teachers (39.9%) or religious groups (12.3%), more than those who learn from their parents (34.3%). Even for respondents from very religious families, only 49% depend on their parents as the source of religious knowledge. [Q57]

SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND LIFESTYLES

Muslim youth seem to be quite modern in their lifestyle but the influence of new media may be quite limited.

Three out of every four Muslim youth list watching TV as one of their top five favourite pastimes, followed by 61.7% who choose “listening to music” and 52.3% who choose “surfing the internet”. The significance of internet usage, however, must be qualified, as the respondent group are those who rank it at third (21.1%), as compared with the 9.4% who rank it top. [Q29] In fact, 36.0% of the Muslim youth do not use the internet, yet another 14.4% only use it to do so. Only 23.4% surf the internet daily and 24.9% of it once or twice a week. [Q101] While 94.1% use a mobile phone, only 9.3% use a smart phone. [Q111]

In terms of social networking, many Muslim youth are not involved in civil society. While nearly three quarters of the respondents claim to be “active in group, in an office or function at school, college or university”, perhaps due to social desirability, only about one in four are reportedly actively involved in youth organisations (such as the Scouts), NGOs, clubs or societies. The reported participation in political parties is even lower at only 14.2%. As many as 36.2% of all respondents do not report any groups that they are active in. [Q134]

One may therefore suggest that the cultural preference and taste of Malaysian Muslim youth may be largely shaped by highly-controlled broadcast media, local religious teachers and parents, much more than their peers and indeed, people of other autonomous social groupings. This explains their near universal reported rejection of un-Islamic lifestyles, such as occasional beer drinking (96.1%), taking soft drugs (98.9%), extramarital sex (98.4%), watching pornographic movies (975%) and homosexuality (99.4%) [Q15] yet the simultaneous presence of a strong minority (40.7%) who agree or strongly agree that “the western music, movies and clothes are cooler than ours”. [Q27]

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Perhaps driven by social desirability, when asked for their importance in life, the respondents gave high average scores on most of the matters asked, from 8.42 (enjoying life to the fullest) to 9.88 (being good at their work). Interestingly, the two matters, markedly lower marks are recorded, namely 6.50 for “becoming rich” and 7.65 for “acceptance of ethnic and religious differences”.

A better measure of the social outlook of Muslim youth may therefore be what they consider “in” and “out” for the youth of...
today, which arguably may reflect the respondents’ reading of the objective reality – what their peers think – rather than their own subjective values. While there is a near consensus to see “technology,” “university education” and “success in career” as “in”, the respondents differ substantially on “self-employment”, “marriage”, “political involvement”, “designer clothes”, “European Union”, “healthy food” and “taking drugs” by about 2:1. There is almost an even split over “faithfulness” and “taking responsibility for others” as “in” or “out” (Q4A-G). An index of “collectivist values”, as perceived by the respondents of their peers, perhaps can be formulated by adding up the answers to those divisive questions and arguably indicating an emphasis on collectivist lifestyle: “marriage”, “faithfulness”, “taking responsibility for others” and “political involvement” (in “self-employment”, “designer clothes” and “taking drugs” (out). “European Union” and “healthy food” are excluded even though the split on a basis of 2:1 the other may just indicate knowledge while the latter may be equally preferred by both “individualists” and “collectivists”. This generates a Collective Value Index from 1 to 8, meaning a person who considers “marriage”, “faithfulness”, “taking responsibility for others” and “political involvement” to be “in” and “self-employment”, “designer clothes” and “taking drugs” to be “out” would yield a value of 8 while someone who thinks the exact opposite would yield a value of 1. Unlike the Religious Authoritarianism index, the bar chart below shows a bell curve slightly skewed to the end of collectivistic, with the extreme ends (1 and 2, 7 and 8) being around 10%. POLITICS Malaysian Muslim youth are generally apolitical, with three quarters of the respondents showing little or no interest at all about politics. Of those eligible for voting, as many as 66.3% of the respondents have not registered as voters, and another 20.0% have never voted despite having registered. (Q45) This is consistent with the recent low levels of political involvement (Q6C) or self-reported party activism. (Q13D) Such political apathy poses questions on the commitment of Muslim youth to democracy. Although the belief in the inevitability of violence in society scores only an average of 3.44 out of 10, nearly one in 10 respondents rate it at 8-10, suggesting a potential threat. The notion to replace politicians with clergies or self-reported party activism. (Q13D) remains the least democratically-inclined answer for all questions. It is also important to note that two thirds of the questions are capturing the respondents’ views on political efficacy and interest, while another question tries to capture gender bias, only the question on the need of political parties aims to capture authoritarianism. Hence, a low score here should not be interpreted as an outright affirmation for authoritarianism, but moreso reflecting a sense of apathy or inefficacy. And simply because this index is not capturing political authoritarianism per se, it can be used to explain political attitude elsewhere (such as religious authoritarianism) without being tautological. Generally, Muslim youth have a slightly skewed socially-conservative index largely through conventional media which are tightly controlled by the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional. Television is the top source (30.4%), followed by newspapers (23.1%), Internet (9.7%), school (8.9%) and people around them (16.6%). (Q46) Interestingly, 34% follow regularly developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Palestine while 26.4% and 19.9%, respectively, follow regularly local and national news events. (Q47)

OVERALL ANALYSIS Both the Collective Value and Democratic Value indices constructed from the survey data show a bell-curve distribution, with skewed distribution of the Religious Authoritarianism index, indicating that Muslim youth are more diverse than their monolithic outlook on the public role of Islam would suggest. However, how do we explain their religious authoritarianism? Will changes in any index affect some changes in their view on faith and politics? Unfortunately, there is no simple correlation to the Religious Authoritarianism index and the other two indices. In other words, individualistic or not, believing in democracy or not, Malaysian Muslim youth seem to be equally drawn to greater fusion of religion and state. This could simply be the outcome of social desirability, that the political correctness is so is the islamisation of the state that even those individualists or democrats would not openly question these positions, which signals the discursive terrains amongst young Muslims in Malaysia. What may make one less authoritarian while even being conservative? We have learned that family education does not matter as much as one may expect. Could formal education have made a difference? As half of the respondents attended some form of religious school, could that have made a difference? The answer is negative.
Given this context, the outlook for Muslim youth must not be taken as automatically informed by their religion. A strong emphasis on religion may well be a distorted expression of ethno-nationalism for a community feeling under siege. As Islam serves as the most important element of the ethnic boundary for the composite majority group of Malay-Muslims, the heavily controlled mainstream media, which most Muslim youth that were surveyed depend on for information, has placed Islam – or more accurately, the official interpretations or promoted understandings of Islam – on an unquestionable pedestal. Religious conservativism and religious authoritarianism may look similar when we interpret a high approval of Muslim youth for substitution of the Federal Constitution by the Quran or for amputation as a penalty for theft.

Measures of non-authoritarian religiosity, either more universal or Islam-specific, should be constructed for similar studies in the future.

While many of the findings in this survey may suggest a monolithically conservative and authoritarian demographic group, a more careful look has unveiled some nuanced diversity. Methodologically, a challenge in interpreting the data from this survey is the possible effect of social desirability, namely, to what extent are the respondents providing politically correct answers rather than their genuine answers. To overcome this, my analysis favours questions that reveal differences rather than consensus. A related question is the representativeness of the sample. Is it a reflection or distortion of the reality when nearly 90% of respondents report that they come from very or rather religious families or half of them have attended some religious educational institution? If the answers are driven by social desirability coupled by ambiguity, then the near-consensus answers may become meaningless. On the other hand, if these are genuine answers from a biased sample, then all of the answers would have to be weighted if we can find out how an unbiased sample should be. The possibility of sampling bias ironically confirms the value of this pioneering study since a more accurate demographic profile of Muslim youth is yet to be established.

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COUNTRY REPORT

INDONESIA
THE BIG PICTURE

- Indonesian Muslim youths are optimistic, happy with their lives and see their future positively.
- The nuclear family plays a key role in the personal development of young Indonesian Muslims. The influence of the family is greatest in the age group 15 to 19 years.
- Young Indonesian Muslims are very keen on raising their own family. They are determined to give their children a better life than their own.
- Indonesian Muslim youths see themselves first as Muslims and then as Indonesians.
- More than 90 percent of Indonesian Muslim youths state that it is important to believe in God, more than 60 percent that it is important to become a good Muslim.
- For young Muslims in Indonesia religion becomes an asset amidst the rapid changes that are experienced by Indonesian society.
- Only 13.5% of Muslim youths approve of polygamy. Far more young women disapprove of polygamy than young men.
- Muslim youths in Indonesia are more likely to observe religious rituals if there is an element of social control.
- Female respondents place greater emphasis on their Islamic identity and observe religious practices more regularly than their male counterparts.
- Almost 90 percent of young Indonesian Muslims have a sense of responsibility towards other people. At the same time, they appear very self-involved, ambitious and keen to reach their goals and shape their future independently.
- The dependence on technology drastically changed the lifestyle of young Indonesian Muslims, especially of those who live in the city.
- The majority of Indonesian Muslim youths have accepted the country’s current political and economic situation – more than 60 percent think that Indonesia is on the right track.
- More than 70 percent of young Muslims in Indonesia think that people have the power to change governments if they do not approve of them.
- 49 percent of Indonesian Muslim youths do not think that religious leaders should replace politicians.
- More than 70 percent have no problem with women taking over leadership in society.
- Rural Muslim youths have a more idealistic view of politics, are more likely to be involved in political processes and are more optimistic about the future of Indonesia than their urban counterparts.
- The more affluent among the working Muslim youth have less trust in the government than their less wealthy counterparts.
PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

YOUNG INDONESIAN MUSLIMS ARE OPTIMISTIC, HAPPY WITH THEIR LIVES AND SEE THEIR FUTURE POSITIVELY.

Overall, the respondents appear optimistic, content with their lives and self-confident about their present and their future. An overwhelming 93.8 % state that all in all they are happy with their lives. 83.6 % of the respondents view themselves as “full of energy and ready for action” and 58% of the respondents are certain that they can choose their field of work or study. More than two-thirds state that they enjoy their life and are satisfied with their economic condition.

On the other hand there are those who assume a less active role in their lives, even adopting a rather fatalistic point of view at certain points: 51.9% view themselves as “shy and reserved”, 52.9% of the survey’s participants state that they do not like to debate with others and 50.8% of the respondents admit that they feel inferior to other people. 41.8 % of the respondents state that they feel lonely sometimes. The degree of optimism among the youths strongly correlates with certain social variables as will be shown throughout the report.

Interestingly, when it comes to judging the development of Indonesia in recent years, the youths appear a little less enthusiastic: 53.5 % of the respondents said that the national government’s track record has neither improved nor worsened. 64% of young Indonesian Muslims who took the survey view the economic outlook as the same or even worse as compared to previous years. Overall, the respondents doubt that the government’s public services can address their needs and rights, or those of the Indonesian public as a whole. There is rather low confidence in the government – a phenomenon which will be explained in greater detail later in the report.

The Muslim youths questioned for this survey appear to have very clear ideas about what they want and where they want to be. Success is highly relevant to them and they are eager to learn something new, to climb up the social ladder. More than 97% of rural respondents feel that they can only meet their needs if they get rich.

Respondents between the ages of 20 and 25 are more likely to describe themselves as working hard to achieve what they want. Also, they are keener on becoming rich. This data indicates that young people’s view of life becomes more realistic with age. It can be said that by the time the respondents are between 20 and 25 years old they start feeling burdened with greater social responsibilities towards their original families, current family members, as well as the families they plan to have.

RURAL YOUTHS ARE INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF QUALITY EDUCATION.

Surprisingly the survey revealed that respondents from rural areas are more likely to view professional success and becoming rich as important goals than their urban counterparts. Also, they are increasingly aware of the importance of quality education. This data might contradict the commonly held view of rural life. It also reflects how the increasing integration of Indonesian society with the market economy has led to a growth in the influence of money, since the public needs money to fulfill their basic needs. Therefore rural respondents feel that they can only meet their needs if they get rich.

These notions of optimism, ambition and goal orientation vary when one takes a more differentiated look at certain social factors: gender, social environment (urban and rural), age (15-19 and 20-25), level of education and income.

However, rural Muslim youths who took the survey still have an inactive and, in certain cases, fatalistic view of themselves. Rural respondents are likely to have the following characteristics: (1) they tend to be disinclined to debate with others; (2) they feel inferior to other people; (3) they tend to believe that fate determines whether they will be rich or poor as well as successful or unsuccessful and (4) they frequently feel lonely.
COUNTRY REPORT: INDONESIA

On the other hand, urban respondents are expected to be more independent financially and more capable of meeting their needs as compared to their rural counterparts. Urban respondents need to have greater financial certainty due to the higher cost of living in cities. More urban respondents feel that they are in a better economic state than those who live in villages.

Unsurprisingly, the survey shows that respondents who earn higher wages are likely to be more optimistic. Those who make over one million Rupiah per month (29.5% of the working respondents) are more likely to be confident about their ability to work or study in the field of their choice and to describe themselves as “full of energy and thrust for action”. Nevertheless, also more than 80% of the less affluent working youths characterize themselves this way.

Still, the young people with a lower income are more stressed out from the burden of work, and some of them won’t even deal with or try to find a solution to this stress. They are also more likely to feel lonely and have a lower self-esteem than the richer youths.

The survey found that the more educated the respondents, the more critical they become. This group is also more likely to be concerned about their future. They are very afraid of the prospect of losing their jobs, perceive themselves as energetic individuals who are keen on new activities, and believe that those who work hard deserve to be rich. They also identify themselves as hard workers who are determined to attain their goals. This group adopts an aggressive stance, as reflected by data showing their tendency to debate. On the other hand, many less educated respondents are very averse to debate.

The survey also revealed that young Indonesian Muslim women simultaneously attempt to be successful at home as well as at the workplace or in studies. However, more female respondents perceive themselves as less energetic and less keen on activities than their male counterparts. Compared to the male respondents more of them feel inferior, are disinclined to debate, and view themselves as shy and quiet. On the other hand, far more women who took the survey wish to be good mothers to their children as compared to men who wish to be good fathers to their kids.

Interestingly, 47.5% of the respondents say that they are Muslims first in contrast to 40.8% who emphasize on their identity as Indonesians. Only 10.7% of all respondents put their ethnic identity first. Most of the respondents who emphasize on their Muslim identity live in the cities, have high income jobs and have attended university. On the other hand, male respondents from rural areas with low incomes of less than 400 thousand Rupiah a month are likely to see themselves foremost as Indonesians, while women with a basic school education are more likely to put their ethnic identities first, thereby proving ethnicity’s enduring power as a socio-political force.

In a sense, the large number of urban respondents (some of whom make over one million Rupiah a month) putting their Muslim identity in the forefront proves the importance of Islam as a source of strength and positive energy to cope with Indonesian urban life, which is becoming tougher and more competitive.

FAMILY ORIENTATION

THE NUCLEAR FAMILY PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THE PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT OF YOUNG INDONESIAN MUSLIMS.

The nuclear family plays a central role in the personal development of the Muslim Indonesian youth. As the leading agent of socialization it becomes an intermediary institution and the venue for Indonesia’s Muslim youth to develop their personality in a more positive manner. The family even functions as a social shield, becoming an important constituent in the construction of the youths’ self-confidence (compare with Somantri, 2007).

95.9% of the respondents said that the relationship with their parents is very good and 92.1% responded in the negative to the statement “my parents do not care”. 78.1% of the respondents said that they always asked for their parents’ advice, while 96.5% stated that their parents often give them advice. 78.1% of the respondents even said that it would be wrong for children not to ask their parents for advice.

INDONESIAN MUSLIM YOUTHS SEE THEMSELVES FIRST AS MUSLIMS AND THEN AS INDONESIANS.

Interestingly, 47.5% of the respondents say that they are Muslims first in contrast to 40.8% who emphasize on their identity as Indonesians. Only 10.7% of all respondents put their ethnic identity first. Most of the respondents who emphasize on their Muslim identity live in the cities, have high income jobs and have attended university. On the other hand, male respondents from rural areas with low incomes of less than 400 thousand Rupiah a month are likely to see themselves foremost as Indonesians, while women with a basic school education are more likely to put their ethnic identities first, thereby proving ethnicity’s enduring power as a socio-political force.

In a sense, the large number of urban respondents (some of whom make over one million Rupiah a month) putting their Muslim identity in the forefront proves the importance of Islam as a source of strength and positive energy to cope with Indonesian urban life, which is becoming tougher and more competitive.
The survey also found that many respondents see the nuclear family as a leading example. Honoring one's parents – a tenet taught by the Al-Qur’an – seems to be a value deeply ingrained in the respondents. 30.2% of the respondents said that one of their goals in life is to be the best of mothers or fathers. The nuclear family is still seen as the best way of raising a child. 48.6% of the respondents said that they will raise their child in the same way in which they were raised. 25.7% of the respondents (especially those with a less religious approach) view conflicts with parents as wrong and are averse to acting without asking for their parents' opinions.

However, respondents with a basic school education are not entirely uncritical of their parents. Respondents in this category often plan to raise their children with more discipline than was involved in their own upbringing. This might be prompted by the view that their skills and qualifications are no longer sufficient for a decent life. This group hopes that their children will not have the same difficulties as they did.

On the other hand, respondents with a university education are relatively more critical in their approach to their parents. Their levels of obedience are not as total as those of respondents who only had an elementary school education. However, these highly educated respondents still manage to maintain good relations with their parents in spite of differences in opinion. They are more independent, particularly in a psychological context. Compared to their less educated counterparts they are less likely to ask their parents for advice and do not spend too much time with them.

The findings also showed that the lower the respondents' income, the higher their psychological dependence on their parents. This type of respondent is more likely to ask the parents for advice in dealing with problems that they face. On the other hand, respondents with higher incomes are more independent in decision-making.

The survey showed that respondents with a basic school education are more obedient and less critical compared to their better-educated counterparts. They are also more psychologically dependent on their families. Respondents from this group are more likely to ask their parents for advice and avoid conflicts with their mothers and fathers despite disagreements. They tend to view conflicts and disagreements with parents as wrong and are averse to acting without asking for their parents’ opinions.

On the other hand, respondents with a university education are relatively more critical in their approach to their parents. Their levels of obedience are not as total as those of respondents who only had an elementary school education. However, even these highly educated respondents still manage to maintain good relations with their parents in spite of differences in opinion. They are more independent, particularly in a psychological context. Compared to their less educated counterparts they are less likely to ask their parents for advice and do not spend too much time with them.

The attachment to the nuclear family varies according to age, gender, place of residence, education and income. The survey found that the younger the respondents, the more disciplined and protected they are by their families. On the other hand, older respondents receive less protection and control from their nuclear families. Out of the 51.4% of respondents who feel that they are always regulated by their parents, most are of a relatively young age. While most urban respondents said that they intend to raise their children in the same way as they were raised, their rural counterparts place a little more emphasis on religious education.

Those respondents who make more than 1 million Rupiah a month stated that they will maintain good relations with their parents, even though they might disagree with their elders. On the other hand, respondents who make less than 400,000 Rupiah a month (38.5% of the working youths) displayed a more critical stance when questioned about the education of their own children. Members of this group said that they will be stricter in raising their children as compared to the upbringing they received from their parents. These numbers confirm an ongoing trend in Indonesian society: There is more social-vertical mobility among the younger generation of Muslims. Thus, one can say that there are a number of factors in the respondents’ upbringing that did not prepare them for the challenges of the modern world.
**COUNTRY REPORT: INDONESIA**

**YOUNG INDONESIAN MUSLIMS ARE VERY KEEN ON RAISING THEIR OWN FAMILY.**

Overall, the survey shows that many young Indonesian Muslims are very keen on raising their own family. Their orientation towards family is a means to obtain a better life for themselves and their loved ones. The family also provides psychological warmth and becomes a way to attain individual happiness. In addition, it works as a psycho-sociological shield and a shelter from the strains and uncertainties of life in contemporary Indonesia. For many respondents raising the ideal family is also a way of fulfilling their responsibilities towards their society and nation.

An overwhelming 94.4% of all respondents said that raising a family paves the way for a happier life, while 30.1% of the participants stated that becoming a good parent is one of their primary goals in life. 57.3% said that it is important to marry and raise a family. Children play a central role in the family structure favored by young Indonesian Muslims. 96.4% of all respondents said that they wish to have children. 71.6% of the participants stated that they want at least two kids (sons or daughters).

If one takes a closer look at the female respondents, it becomes evident that young Muslim women want both: a happy family and a successful career. The survey found a slightly higher number of women who put off marriage in order to focus on their careers at the beginning of their marriage.

**RELIGION**

When asked about their religious orientation, Muslim youths in Indonesia appear highly religious. They rate faith in God and being religiously devout higher than professional success, marriage, friends or enjoying life. Religion provides a foundation and positive energy for many young Indonesian Muslims which they use to achieve certainty and happiness in their lives and to secure a successful future. Many of them need this positive energy as a strong psychological pedestal amidst the uncertainties caused by rapid social changes. Islam becomes an inspiring meaning of life through which Indonesia’s Muslim youth can interpret their reality and a source of stability to deal with the increasing uncertainties in Indonesian life today. Islamic faith is used as a psychological shield and a shelter. Religion is also a socio-psychological asset in attaining and securing the future that the respondents aspire to. For them, Islam is the energy they need in order to pursue education, get a job and establish their careers.

The respondents constructed their religious understanding with a rather pessimistic and unclear outlook on Indonesian society today. The uncertainties that the respondents have to deal with gave them the drive to ensure that their life will be better in the future. Thus, on the one hand their religiosity developed out of a strong tendency towards individual fulfillment. This is understandable, particularly for the young respondents aged 15 to 25. Respondents in this age group tend to use their energies to prepare themselves mentally for the future and to acquire new skills that will help them live happier, more prosperous lives in the future.

On the other hand, religious upbringing plays a major role in the construction of the young Muslims’ religiosity. 71.5% of the respondents come from a religious family, while 16.7% come from very devout households. Only 10.1% of the participants admitted that they come from non-religious families. As pointed out earlier, the nuclear family is the main point of reference in the personal development of Muslim youths in Indonesia. Therefore the influence of the familial background cannot be underestimated.

**THE YOUTHS ARE MORE LIKELY TO OBSERVE RELIGIOUS RITUALS IF THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF SOCIAL CONTROL INVOLVED.**

Ritual practice is not as solid as their personal, social and familial identities. When the practice of Islam involves a high level of social control, it is observed more frequently by the young Indonesian Muslims. On the other hand, when the level of social control is low, the observance of religious practice by young people is also relatively low. For example, if one takes a closer look at the practices during Ramadan: family members break their fast together and partake of the pre-dawn sahar meal before the start of the fasting day together. Conventionally devout and very religious households often hold congregational prayers in their houses, though they are more likely to do so at a mosque. These families also collectively read prayers from the Al-Qur’an during this time of the year. These kind of collective rituals are followed more frequently by the Muslim youths in Indonesia.

**ONLY 13.5% OF MUSLIM YOUTH APPROVE OF THE PRACTICE OF POLYGAMY.**

As for actual Islamic practices, 59.6% said that they fasted during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. 28.7% of those who took the survey said they prayed five times a day. 10.8% always read the al-Quran. On a more extreme note, 38.1% of the respondents said that the headscarf is compulsory for women, while 60.1% said that Muslim youths who drink alcohol should be whipped. However, interestingly, only 13.5% of all respondents expressed their approval of the oft debated practice of polygamy.
As was stated earlier, 59.6% of all respondents said they fasted during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan. However, only 28.7% said that they pray five times a day, while only 10.8% admitted to regularly reading the al-Qur’an. In places where social control is lax, 61.3% read the al-Qur’an from time to time, 39.7% said that they pray sometimes, while only 8.9% fast sometimes.

Thus, Islamic values also become a reference point for the Muslim youths in establishing their own household and building up their family's social identity. 69.7% believed that their prospective husband or wife should convert to Islam if he or she observes a different faith. 90.1% stated that they do not wish to marry anyone of a different religion.

As with other aspects of the survey, the observation of religious rituals varies according to age, gender, place of residence, educational levels, and income. The data shows that younger respondents (between 15-19 year olds) are more likely to emphasize on their personal religious identity. This category is likelier to view the importance of being a good Muslim compared to their counterparts between the ages of 20 to 25. This age group also stated that a veil is compulsory for women and more respondents from this younger age group are more likely to read the al-Qur’an.

However, when it comes to the question whether a prospective spouse of a different religion has to convert to Islam, the older respondents are much more conservative: 74.5% against 64.5%. Rural respondents are more likely to affirm their religious identity in a personal context or in the context of their family’s social standing. They are more observant of religious rituals and obligations. Rural respondents make up the majority of the 69.7% of participants who believe that their spouse should convert to Islam if he or she comes from a different religious background. The number of rural respondents who observe religious rituals is also higher – they constitute a substantial part of the 28.7% of respondents who said that they pray five times a day. Last but not least, this group of respondents accounts for a majority of the 60.1% of respondents who called for young Muslims who drink alcohol to be whipped. More rural respondents are well versed in the al-Qur’an than their urban counterparts.

Data from the survey also indicates that the better educated the respondents the more varied are their sources of information about Islam. Furthermore, the survey found that the more educated the respondents, the stronger is their inclination in observing religious rituals. The levels of affirmation and strengthening of religious identity at the personal and family levels are also relatively high. For example, respondents with a university education got information about Islam from (1) their local clerics (kiai and ustaz), (2) their parents, (3) prayer groups, (4) books and magazines, and (5) friends.

The data also shows that this group accounts for most of the 59.9% of respondents who consistently fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. University educated respondents are more inclined to pray five times a day, and many are likely to ask their spouse to convert to Islam. On the other hand, this group also made up most of the 13.5% of respondents who approve of or agree with polygamy.

On their part, low-income respondents tend to strictly internalize their religious identity and that of their families. Their level of submissiveness more or less follows their pattern of worship. Most of the 90.1% of respondents who said that they do not wish to marry someone of a different faith are from the lower income groups. They also account for many of the 38.1% of respondents who view the headscarf as compulsory for women. Most of them are among the 16.7% of the participants who admitted to come from very religious households. This group also has a specific pattern concerning prayers. The study showed that the lower the respondents’ income, the more likely they are to pray. On the other hand, the higher the respondents’ income, the less likely they are to pray.

There are strong indications that this group is still dependent on a word-of-mouth culture to raise their religious awareness, such as prayer groups near their houses. This data shows how strong group bonds among lower income respondents are. It also reflects the significant role played by religious figures in enriching and deepening their religious awareness.

When it comes to the issue of the headscarf, many respondents hold the view that the woman has the final say. 20.8% of the respondents said that the woman has the right to determine whether she wears the headscarf or not. Only 0.5% said that the woman’s father or husband should determine whether she wears the headscarf or not. As was previously said, the data showed that the better educated the respondent the more likely he or she is to believe that the decision to wear the headscarf depends on the woman. Also, lower income respondents believed that the decision to wear the headscarf was subjective and could only be made by each individual woman, a view shared by older respondents and those who live in cities.

The purpose of a headscarf for the respondents is an aspect that needs to be brought up. 17.8% of the respondents said that the headscarf would “protect women from men’s glances”, while 71.1% even said that it looks attractive on a woman. Most respondents who believe the headscarf would protect women are those from rural areas with a decent wage as well as the age group of 20 to 25 years. Those who find the headscarf attractive are usually respondents with a basic education belonging to the age group of 20 to 25 year olds. 16.1% of the respondents said that the headscarf would protect women are those from rural areas with a decent wage as well as the age group of 20 to 25 years. Those who find the headscarf attractive are usually respondents with a basic education belonging to the age group of 20 to 25 year olds.

FEMALE RESPONDENTS PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THEIR ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND FULLFIL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES MORE REGULARLY THAN THEIR MALE COUNTERPARTS.

Female respondents are likelier than men to hold on to their Muslim identity. When it comes to marriage, none of the women participating in the survey intends to convert if she is married to a non-Muslim, but interestingly they said that they would let their husband retain his own beliefs. However, there are still some female respondents who hope that their husbands will convert...
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Surveys in Malaysia and Indonesia

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Even though many Indonesian Muslim women are not inclined to marry non-Muslim men, they are willing to compromise. They are willing to become good Muslims themselves and allow their husbands to continue practicing their faith.

**FIGURE 17**

Are you willing to marry someone who has a different religion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I'm willing</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, I'm not willing</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(If “Yes, I'm willing”) What do you do about your spouse?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I will allow my spouse to keep his/her faith</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I will ask my spouse to convert to my religion</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female respondents also tend to be more critical of the practice of polygamy. Far more women disagree with polygamy as compared to men. They feel that it is unjust and they are concerned about the question of gender equality in this context.

**FIGURE 18**

It’s okay to practice polygamy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know / No answer</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, young Muslim women are more likely to observe Islamic practices. The survey showed that the proportion of women who pray five times a day, fast during the holy month of Ramadan and read the al-Qur’an is actually higher than that of their male counterparts.

**FIGURE 19**

How often do you fulfill all of the five daily prayers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know / No answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How often do you read the Quran?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know / No answer</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How often do you fast in the month of Ramadan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know / No answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT, LIFESTYLE AND VALUES**

It has already been stated that young Indonesian Muslims present themselves as a rather self-involved generation, concerned about their own lives and future. However, the data also showed an increasing awareness of social responsibility among the respondents. The strong emphasis on the self and this heightened sense of social responsibility are two sides of the same coin. Though they seem different on the surface, both orientations are actually attempts to build up certainty amid the public’s lack of confidence in Indonesia’s social system. Besides fulfilling the respondents’ psycho-social needs, the heightened sense of social awareness is also a response to the relative economic deprivation that they face.

**MUSLIM YOUTHS FEEL A STRONG SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS OTHER PEOPLE.**

89.6% of the Indonesian Muslim youths who took the survey said that they feel a sense of responsibility towards other people. 54.5% said they are willing to help poor people, 51.6% hold the opinion that hard work will pay off. In this context it also needs to be noted that the youths show signs of a heightened fear of factors that could disrupt their personal stability: 49.7% are concerned about pollution, while 42.3% of the respondents are concerned about the threat of terrorism. 91.4% of all respondents fear losing their jobs, while 89.1% are afraid of the possibility that they will be diagnosed with serious diseases like cancer or AIDS (many of these respondents are city dwellers).
The survey respondents’ statements about their sources of stress provide another indication of the strong orientation towards the self and the psychological upheaval faced by young Indonesian Muslims as a result of their increasing integration into the market economy. 24.7% of the respondents name lack of money as a source of stress. 16.8% cite problems at work. 10.6% are stressed because of problems in their relationship or marriage. The identification of financial constraints which hinder them from fulfilling their personal needs as the primary cause of stress reflects the strains the respondents face as a result of their increasing integration into the global market economy. Interestingly, when it comes to the solution of their problems, the youths’ need for the support of others to ease their pain becomes evident: 38.4% of the respondents would confide in their friends, while another 17.2% would confide in their family. Only 12.7% chose to deal with the problem on their own by keeping it to themselves. About 16.5% chose to deal with their stress by listening to music. Only a very small number of respondents turn to substance abuse to deal with their stress, with 0.9% turning to alcohol and another 0.8% using tranquillizers to deal with their problems.

**FIGURE 22**

Some believe that life is not easy and stressful. Which one of these issues below is the most frequent cause for your stress?

- Physical appearance: 24.7%
- Social life: 16.8%
- Relationship with parents: 10.6%
- Relationship with partner/spouse: 8.7%
- Others: 8.3%
- Not having money: 4.3%
- Health: 2.1%
- Let it go away by itself: 1.5%
- Others: 0.9%
- Don’t know/No answer: 0.6%

**FIGURE 23**

If you are stressed, what do you usually do to overcome it?

- Talk to friends: 38.4%
- Watch movies: 17.2%
- Talk to family members: 16.5%
- Listen to music: 12.7%
- Consult with experts (psychologists, religious leaders, etc.): 6.0%
- Drink alcohol: 4.3%
- Consume sedatives: 1.5%
- Let it go away by itself: 0.9%
- Others: 0.6%
- Don’t know/No answer: 0.6%

The dependence on technology drastically changed the lifestyle of Indonesian Muslim youths, especially those living in the city. When it comes to leisure time, the arrival of mass communication and technology drastically changed the lifestyle of young Indonesian Muslims – technological devices are starting to encroach upon the time formerly spent with peers or family. Young Indonesian Muslims increasingly engage in solitary actions in their leisure time: 78.7% watch TV while 55.8% listen to music or the radio. 27.6% of the respondents read books, newspapers or magazines, while 22.7% surf the internet.

Indonesian Muslims – technological devices are starting to encroach upon the time formerly spent with peers or family. Young Indonesian Muslims increasingly engage in solitary actions in their leisure time: 78.7% watch TV while 55.8% listen to music or the radio. 27.6% of the respondents read books, newspapers or magazines, while 22.7% surf the internet. However, young Indonesian Muslims have not given up their social engagements completely: 46% meet up with their peers or older family members, 29.6% exercise, while 23.2% travel. However, young Indonesian Muslims have not given up their social engagements completely: 46% meet up with their peers or older family members, 29.6% exercise, while 23.2% travel. However, young Indonesian Muslims have not given up their social engagements completely: 46% meet up with their peers or older family members, 29.6% exercise, while 23.2% travel. However, young Indonesian Muslims have not given up their social engagements completely: 46% meet up with their peers or older family members, 29.6% exercise, while 23.2% travel.
When asked about their attitudes concerning issues like drug-use, sex and pornography, a deep sense of piety becomes evident: 52.9% of the respondents disapprove of alcoholic drinks, and a similar number disapprove of polygamy. 51.2% strongly disagree of narcotics, while 50.7% of the respondents strongly disagree of premarital sex. Another 53.7% frowned upon pornographic movies, while 54.9% strongly disapproved of gays and lesbians. Although the respondents disapproved of premarital sex, they cited the need for heightened awareness about sex and sex-education in schools.

The youths’ lifestyles vary with age, place of residence, education, and income. Younger respondents between the ages of 15 to 19 years have higher social bonds: not only are they still encapsulated in their nuclear family but they also show a stronger tendency to engage in social activities. They constitute a majority of the 40.6% of participants who are willing to participate in youth activities. As a group with tight social bonds, they are more likely to confide in their friends during times of stress. They are also more likely to use the internet than their older counterparts. Overall, they fill their spare time with the activities of teenagers all around the world. This includes listening to music, surfing the internet, reading, playing on the Play Station, and exercise.

Asked about values and morality, they condemn all practices deemed immoral: They tend to strongly disapprove of alcohol consumption, using marijuana, watching pornography or being either gay or lesbian. Also, they have a stricter view on polygamy than their older counterparts.

Meanwhile, respondents between the ages of 20 to 25 tend to be more independent and at the same time show a stronger sense of responsibility towards their parents and family. For example, they are more likely to confide in their relatives in times of stress. They prefer to spend their spare time with their family or at the mosque.

However, with increasing age they are more likely to experience stress because of a lack of money. They account for a large part of the 43.6% of respondents who emphasize on the need to earn a decent wage. In this sense, money can be seen as a manifestation of how this older age group expresses their social responsibilities and their identity.

**MUSLIM URBAN YOUTHS DISPLAY A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO LIFE THAN THEIR RURAL COUNTERPARTS.**

When it comes to differentiating between urban and rural youths, it should be noted that urban respondents show more realistic expectations from life, the need for a healthy and secure life and a higher sense of responsibility towards society. The lifestyle of this group is developed in tandem with their increased reliance on telecommunication appliances and a strong affirmation of their Islamic identity. Urban dwellers make up the majority of the 83% of respondents who use cell phones, as well as the 13.3% of those who use the internet on a daily basis. In addition, urban respondents also make up the majority of those who spend their spare time watching TV.

On the other hand, young rural respondents and those with low incomes of less than 400 thousand rupiah show the most acute symptoms of relative deprivation. Therefore, these two groups feel a strong need for social acknowledgement and group ties. For

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The respondents’ dependence on telecommunications is quite high – 83.3% of the respondents use a cell phone. However, only 6.1% use smart phones like the i-Phone and Blackberry. The number of internet users is meager: while 13.3% of participants said they use the internet daily, 37.1% of young Indonesian Muslims claimed that they never use the internet. But it must be noted, that these figures are an indication of how this older age group expresses their social responsibilities and their identity.

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On the other hand, young rural respondents and those with low incomes of less than 400 thousand rupiah show the most acute symptoms of relative deprivation. Therefore, these two groups feel a strong need for social acknowledgement and group ties. For
example, most of the rural teenage respondents see a strong need for branded clothing. Rural teenagers are also more prone to turn to friends in times of distress. Again, in contrast to their urban counterparts, rural teenage respondents also account for many of the 34.9% of respondents who spend their spare time with their families. A similar pattern can also be found among low-income respondents. These respondents are likely to emphasize on the importance of creating a safe environment. They rate the role played by friends in their lives very highly. Many are likely to follow traditional ways and values and a substantial number would spend their free time in mosques. However, this group also needs social acknowledgement. This is seen by the emphasis they lay on branded clothes and quality education. Last but not least, these respondents tend to rate the importance of becoming wealthy higher than their more affluent counterparts.

Besides the need for social acknowledgement, many low-income respondents often seek an older figure to look up to who can improve their life in the future. They tend to have a positive view of older people and make up a substantial number of the 46.6% respondents who view older people as hard workers who never give up. They also account for a large part of the 57.7% of participants who believe that the older generation places family first on their list of priorities. Many low-income respondents view their own generation as responsible people and regard the young Indonesian people of today as hard workers who do not give up. For these respondents, traditional values provide comfort and certainty in life and serve as a reserve of positive energy.

Another indication of the relative deprivation of lower income respondents is their firsthand witnessing of violence over the past 12 months. Many saw violence among youths first hand. Lower income respondents also make up the largest number of respondents who believe that fate will determine whether someone will be rich or poor, or a success or failure.

On the other hand, respondents who earn more than 1 million Rupiah a month adopt a lifestyle that reflects optimism about their future and establishing themselves. They are also relatively untouched by symptoms of relative deprivation, as compared to rural respondents or those with low incomes who are more vulnerable to this trend. They are more likely to put the importance of getting a decent wage highly with 9.22 on a scale of 10 and are striving to establish a good name for themselves professionally. This group makes up most of the 42% of respondents who care about a safe and healthy life and are concerned about deadly diseases like cancer and about the possibility of getting robbed or physically assaulted. Their raised state of awareness is intended to improve their current and future economic situation.

Their leisurely activities tend to be individual in nature and show the increased access to various forms of information technology and sources of information, as well as their strong dependence on the information and communication industry. They account for most of the 95.8% of respondents who listen to music to pass the time, read books (27%), and surf the internet (22.). They also constitute the majority of the 13% of respondents who use the internet on a daily basis. Nearly all of them (93.3 %) use cell phones, while most of them are among the 61.6% of respondents who use smart phones.

The survey found that the more educated the Muslim youth, the likelier they are to be concerned about the loss of traditional values and culture (out of 44.1% respondents). These respondents are also the majority among the 6.3% of respondents who are likely to witness ethnic and sectarian violence.

**YOUNG MUSLIM WOMEN ARE MORE LIKELY TO ENGAGE WITH THE MODERN INFORMATION AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY.**

Seeen from the perspective of gender, women are more likely to depend on the information and entertainment industry. Listening to music, watching TV, reading and surfing the internet are the top choices for women to fill their free time. When it comes to spending time with others, female respondents prefer to visit shopping centers like traditional markets and malls, shopping (buying something for themselves), meeting with their family and getting involved with a specific activity group.

One could assume that many women feel that they are idle if they have leisure time. It is likely that their interpretation of filling in spare time is engaging in an outdoor activity that is different from their routine household chores. Because they regard the house as part of the domestic realm, they are more likely to acquire their awareness of Islam through groups in the vicinity of their house like neighbors and prayer groups, as well as at school.

In a certain sense, the female respondents’ strong ties to the domestic realm often seem to make them feel comfortable and more protected from the effects of relative deprivation, which they will get in the public realm. That is why many female respondents report that they should be more focused on their domestic realm, as they are more attached to it. They also see the public realm as a secondary aspect that they will deal with once their domestic duties are done.

Many women do express their willingness to be active in various social activities – such as organizing youth-related activities, being active in environmental and animal protection activities or helping handicapped, old and poor people – but these statements can be considered as intentions only. Actually the number of female respondents who are active in social organizations are relatively lower than their male counterparts.

**POLITICS**

The survey’s findings concerning the political views of the youths are quite ambiguous. The youth is highly ambivalent about the state’s presence and its benefits. The young are beginning to widely question the state’s role as the protector and guarantor of prosperity for its citizens. Nevertheless, they still hope that it will play its role as their protector and provide a solution for the relative deprivation that they face.

**THE MAJORITY OF MUSLIM YOUTHS HAVE ACCEPTED THE COUNTRY’S CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION.**

In general, the data showed that many Indonesian Muslim youth have accepted the country’s current political and economic situation. 63.2% of the respondents think that Indonesia is on the right track. 38.7% of the participants said that the government is well run, while 37.5% said it is moderately well run. 31.8% of the respondents are optimistic about Indonesia’s future. 40.6% of the Indonesian people rate the government well, while 30.2% said that the economic situation is much better than it was last year.
However, certain doubts become evident if one takes a closer look: 32% of the respondents said that the country’s economic situation is bad. 31.7% said that the government did poorly at law enforcement nationwide, while 14.2% of all respondents said the government did a poor job in national security. A similar number is critical of the government’s track record, while 50.3% said that corruption and bribery are actually on the rise.

In general, interest in politics among the Muslim youths is quite low. Only 23.1% of the respondents said that they are interested in politics, while a measurer 5.9% said that they are “very interested” in the field. 48.5% of the respondents did not think that everyone is obliged to be interested in politics. Another 48% of respondents even dismissed political activities as boring.

When it comes to voter participation, only 276% of the respondents are involved in local elections and local politics, even though this process influences their daily lives. Only 16.1% stated that they have participated in every election. However, the respondents do pay closer attention to the political process – be it national or international – if it affects their efforts to have a well-established life. 48.8% of the respondents said they are concerned that war will break out in Southeast Asia. They also have a positive view of globalization. 39% of the respondents said that globalization would be the tool to give them a chance of having a better life. Another 36.9% are concerned about corruption, while 39% of the participants are concerned about human rights violations by the state. While slightly more respondents (41.4%) said they have little interest in politics, most or 72% do not believe that all problems should be resolved through violence. Others are concerned about terrorism (42.5%), human rights abuses by the state (47%), radical Islam (40%) and corruption (38%).

MORE THAN 70% OF YOUNG MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA THINK THAT PEOPLE HAVE THE POWER TO CHANGE GOVERNMENTS THEY DO NOT LIKE.

Most of the respondents have a negative view of the actual practice of politics and the conduct of politicians, but at the same time they embrace democratic notions and the possibility of participating in social change. This makes them feel that they can reach a greater good. This positive outlook is based on the view that politics is an adventure as well as an outlet for positive energy and young people are pioneers of change. They also feel obliged, as young Indonesian Muslims, to change the political conditions for the better. 72.7% of the respondents hold the view that citizens can replace a government they disapprove of. About 66.4% believe that an opposition party is a vital pillar of democracy. 47% still think that everyone should be interested in politics. On the other hand, 49 percent of Indonesian Muslim youths do not think that religious leaders should replace politicians.

49 PERCENT OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM YOUTHS DO NOT THINK THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD REPLACE POLITICIANS.

Most of the respondents view “practical politics” as a grey area that is always a bit murky. For example, 48.6% of them replied in the negative when asked if religious leaders should replace politicians in government institutions. Most of them were relatively older city dwellers as well as those who were better educated or better paid. This viewpoint is influenced by news or other information conveyed about politicians who practice “practical politics”, as well as their ideas about the role of religious figures. The more the respondents had access to high quality information, the more critical and realistic was their opinion about politicians. Respondents who have access to multiple, various forms of information wish that the religious leaders whom they look up to as a moral example should not enter into “practical politics”. They are of the opinion that the clerics’ moral edge would be undermined if they were tainted by the negative aspects of politics.

It should be noted that 71% of all respondents obtained their information about politics through television. The data showed that television built up the respondents’ image of “practical politics” and politicians: as architects of incidents that are marked by conflicts and self-interest that are always looking for ways to increase their popularity. The information conveyed by television affirmed their negative views about the dirt in “practical politics”. This is the theatrical side of “practical politics” which induced 29% of all respondents to follow political scandals. Only 5.5% of respondents believe that politics can be an outlet in virtue in public life. The negative side of “practical politics” is brought up yet again, as 64% of all respondents believe that money determines success in a political career. The Indonesian sociologist Koentjaraningrat observed in the 1970’s that “practical politics” stemmed from the habit of taking a shortcut that later became the basis for political pragmatism. There is a belief that “practical politics” is a quick way to gain upward mobility and gain power, popularity and riches. Participation in politics meant an active role in political parties and a fast track towards power, popularity and riches. This can be seen in the case of some legislators and ministers today that are much younger than their counterparts in the New Order era. Some legislators and ministers are glamorous celebrities in their 30s who demonstrate that “practical politics” relies more on individual star power to gain votes instead of being based on the principle of a collective effort for the public good.

Perceptions about the major role played by money in politics also induced a sense of frustration among the survey’s respondents. Some of them consider politics to be as uncool as the Indonesian soap operas (sinetron). This is the despairing viewpoint that led a number of respondents to believe that a strongman would be an effective and useful solution for Indonesian political life. As with other parts of the survey, political views vary with age, gender, place of residence, income and education.

Young people especially from rural areas who have low incomes and a basic education entrust themselves to the state. The survey showed that these respondents proportionally follow political events at the local (gubernatorial) and national (presidential and legislative) levels more actively. The findings confirmed their call on the state to be a presence in their life which will better it in the near future (Ihat Suryana, 2006).

RURAL MUSLIM YOUTHS HAVE A MORE IDEALISTIC VIEW OF POLITICS AND ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

The younger respondents (15-19 years old) tend to see politics as an adventure and as a form of public virtue. On their part, rural respondents have a more idealistic view of politics. This is why they are more likely to approve of religious leaders taking over the politicians’ positions. They also have a more positive opinion about the government’s performance. This group is more likely to be interested in local elections and to follow local political news. Rural respondents are also more optimistic about Indonesia’s future.
They also believe in the need to participate in politics and often call on politicians to pay particular attention to their social strata. They are aware that politics is intertwined with their daily life. This group still hopes that the government’s performance, whether in the executive or legislative bodies, will improve their lot.

Lower income respondents believe more strongly that the country is moving in the right direction. They find the political situation and national security satisfactory. They are also satisfied with the government’s performance and the state of the country’s economy. However, they feel that there are too many immigrants in Indonesia, which indicates that they feel threatened in the economic sector.

The survey also shows that the higher educated Muslim youth respondents are clearly not interested in politics. The research shows that 3.3% of the Muslim university students do not see politics as important. Only 1.4% are interested in politics, while over 48.5% think that interest in the field should not be imposed on others. Of the 53.3% respondents who dismiss politics as boring, many are from this group.

Indonesian Muslim young women tend to support the political status quo. Female respondents are slightly less inclined than their male counterparts to be involved in movements to change the current social and political situation, even though more of them say that the country is moving in the wrong direction and that the economic situation is rather bad. Many of these women do not think that an opposition is vital to democracy in Indonesia.

Like their male counterparts, however, many female respondents disapprove of religious leaders taking over the role of politicians in the Indonesian government. They also strongly disagree with the view that women cannot make good leaders in Indonesia. Nowhere are these women’s beliefs in the status quo as marked as it is in the issue of Indonesia’s ideological foundation, as they rejected the idea of replacing Pancasila with the al-Quran.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
There was a random selection of cities and neighbourhoods at national level and proportionally at the provincial level. In every city/neighbourhood five blocks were selected randomly. In every block two families with members between 15 and 25 years were then again selected randomly. In each of these families, one person between 15 and 25 years was selected.

The respondents were interviewed face to face by trained interviewers.

Quality control on randomly selected 20% of the results was carried out under supervision of the headquarters of Lembaga Survei Indonesia. The general margin of error is +/- 2.6% at a 95% significance level.

The data collection for this survey was carried out from November 18th until 26th, 2010 by Lembaga Survei Indonesia. 1,496 Indonesian citizens aged between 15 and 25 years were questioned.

The sample was selected randomly. The respondents are proportionally distributed over Indonesia’s 33 provinces, in accordance with the official Indonesian 2010 population census.

52.1% of the questioned youths attended a religious school.

25.2% of the questioned youths are senior high school graduates.
COMPARATIVE REPORT
MALAYSIA - INDONESIA
COMPARATIVE REPORT: MALAYSIA - INDONESIA

INTRODUCTION

This survey was initiated by the Goethe-Institut and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in 2010 to portray the condition of Muslim youth in Malaysia and Indonesia. The participants are males and females between the ages of 15 and 25, with educational levels ranging from elementary school to universities, both religious and public institutions. The respondents live in urban and rural areas, are married or single, are currently working or unemployed, and some have also used their right to vote. These youth have the full potential, energy and idealism to make their way in the job market and to become future leaders of their countries.

The survey’s focus is to analyze five basic aspects of the lives of Muslim youth in both countries: personal development, family orientation, religion, social environment, lifestyle, values, and politics. This report will try to make a comparative analysis of the survey’s findings in Indonesia and Malaysia by critically describing, explaining and interpreting their similarities and differences, as well as the various ways in which they are intertwined.

PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

MALAYSIAN AND INDONESIAN YOUTHS ARE GENERALLY HAPPY WITH THEIR LIFE AND LOOK OPTIMISTICALLY INTO THE FUTURE.

The survey has found that there are no significant differences between Muslim youth in Indonesia and Malaysia when it comes to their personal development. Generally, they view themselves as a happy group with a positive and optimistic outlook, and are happy with their life today. Their characteristics and self-image convey the image of energetic, creative, and self-confident young people who are keen to learn new things, embrace technology, and are hardworking, ambitious and driven to be rich and successful.

An important factor in the personal development of young people is the domestic environment in which they are raised. Educational institutions, traditional values, the interpretation of religious teachings, the media, government policies and social values also play their part. The Indonesian and Malaysian Muslim youth who took the survey both grew up after their countries gained independence. Their education is widely supported in their education by the government of Malaysia, they are by and large well educated, with only 2.6% dropping out of school. There is little discrepancy between education levels of young people in rural and urban areas.

Education is a major factor in personal development and an important vehicle in social mobility. Since Malaysian Muslim youth are widely supported in their education by the government of Malaysia, they are by and large well educated, with only 2.6% dropping out of school. They have a secondary school education, a diploma or equivalent degree, and many have university degrees. Muslim youth in Malaysia are fortunate to have a standardised education system in their country and education up to university level is accessible to most young people. There is little discrepancy between education levels of young people in rural and urban areas. The Malaysian government and the private sector have started to develop vocational training for young people; vocational schools provide skills and expertise for the unemployed and university graduates who are looking for a job. Vocational training is not only meant to help young people obtain employment in the fast-growing industrial sector, it is also encouraging them to establish their own business. Given this availability of vocational training and education as well as steady economic growth, it is not surprising that most respondents state they are sure to get the education or job of their choice. Nevertheless, there is an anxiety among them that they may lose their jobs or fail in finding suitable jobs.

With Indonesian Muslim youth it is an entirely different story. Education, especially at university level, is still a luxury that is only accessible to the middle and upper classes, and one that is only available in urban areas. There are significant differences between young people in the cities and the villages. Unlike Malaysia, the management of education in Indonesia still contains many weaknesses. The clearest indication can be seen in the low number of funds allocated to develop the educational sector, the quality of school buildings, the recruitment process for teachers and the institutional system. Other weaknesses include low teachers’ wages and subsidies, teachers’ and students’ welfare, the quality of teachers and the quality of graduates.

The dreams and hopes of youth in both countries comprise the same wishes, they all aspire to be successful and become rich business entrepreneurs, they all want to enjoy the good things in life.
The respondents’ second main goal in life is to become good parents. All young Muslims in both countries share this goal.

Lastly, when it comes to self-identification, Muslim youths in both countries tend to see themselves as Muslims first, and prefer to put their Islamic identity before their Indonesian or Malaysian national or ethnic identities. However, the percentage of Indonesian youths who take this viewpoint is lower than that of their Malaysian counterparts (47.5% to 79.9%), which clearly reveal the difficulty of nation building in multi-ethnic Malaysia more than it specifies religious belief: economic success comes relatively easy.

With respect to family types, most young Malaysian Muslims tend to want many children. Not one of the respondents merely wants one child. Such conditions could well be influenced by a conservative interpretation of Islam, where children are regarded as God’s gift. Therefore, planning or limiting the number of children is viewed as a violation of Islamic law. They may, however, also be due to the financial and ideological encouragement by the Malaysian government, which generously supports large Muslim families.

In Indonesia the conservative view has changed. Only a few respondents wish to have more than two children. The change in this Islamic view has much to do with the New Order regime’s request for Muslim scholars from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah organisations to give their blessings and support to the Family Planning birth control programme in Indonesia, even though transnational Islamic organisations and parties who stridently reject birth control as haram (taboo) caused the programme to come to a standstill.

The majority has the opinion that raising a family makes one’s life happier. Their certainty in gaining happiness in family life is influenced by their good relationship with their parents. They state that their parents have nurtured and raised them well. They also add that their parents mostly tell them what to do, which apparently does not bother them. Their acceptance of parental advice is deeply influenced by traditional values that require respect for older people, and is influenced by Islamic teachings that require obedience to one’s parents.

Although Muslims youth in Malaysia regard the way their parents brought them up positively, only 24.2% wish to raise their children the same way that they were raised. On the other hand, more Indonesian Muslim youths (48.8%) state that they will raise their children in the same way they were raised. More young people in Malaysia (35.9%) wish to bring up their children in a more religious manner, compared with a slightly lower percentage of their Indonesian counterparts.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that more males than females wish to raise their children in a more religious manner, particularly among the Malay ethnic group living on the Malaysian peninsula rather than the Bumiputra indigenous population in Sabah and Sarawak. Moreover, the higher the respondents’ education levels and accomplishments, the higher the percentage of those who wish to raise their children in a more religious manner than they were raised. Only a small number (2.5%) opted for a less religious upbringing for their children. About 20.1% wanted a stricter upbringing for their children, while 15.9% wished for a more loving upbringing for their children.

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MUSLIM YOUTHS IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA ARE GIVEN CONSTANT REMINDERS ABOUT THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO BE GOOD MUSLIMS.

In Indonesia and Malaysia, Muslim youths receive their religious awareness from various sources. They include parents and siblings at home, as well as religious teachers, be they informal mentors at the mosque or formal teachers in school. Religious awareness can also be obtained from various activities in school or other religious activities from radio, television and internet, as well as through government policies. However, young people's knowledge of Islam is generally acquired from religious teachers and parents.

Muslim youths in Indonesia and Malaysia are given constant reminders about their obligations to be good Muslims and how to fulfill their obligations. They have been taught since they were young at home, at school and in their social environment that belief in God is an important, obligatory fundamental. Being a pious Muslim should therefore be an ideal for young people. The majority of the respondents say they were raised in religious or even very religious households, while only a few of them state that they were raised in non-religious households.

While many of the respondents come from religious households and about half of them pursued an education in religious schools not all of them always observe their religious obligations like praying five times a day, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan and reciting prayers from the al-Qur'an. Muslim youth in Indonesia and Malaysia are not very different in this regard. Less than a third admitted to routinely praying five times a day, as most said they pray routinely. Only around 60% said that they always fast in the holy month of Ramadan. More than three quarters of the respondents in both countries even admitted that they understood rather little of the verses in the al-Qur'an. Over 60% admitted that they only read the al-Qur'an periodically. This fact is rather surprising, as nearly 90% of the participants say that they come from religious homes. Women are more likely to carry out their religious obligations compared with men in Indonesia and Malaysia. This circumstance exists because women in Muslim societies are directed and obliged to be moral pillars in family life as well as in society. Women are constantly controlled to carry out religious precepts.

When it comes to polygamy, the majority of Muslim youths in Malaysia and Indonesia disagree with the act. In this regard, more men than women disagree with polygamy. More Indonesian youth disagree with polygamy (86.5%) compared with their Malaysian counterparts (72.7%). This data is heartening for moderates, as their views have shifted from the traditional viewpoint that sees polygamy as an Islamic precept.

It is important to note that the implementation of Shariah law in Islamic countries varies widely, including its interpretation of polygamy. Family laws in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Sudan unreservedly allow polygamy. However, Islamic countries such as Egypt and Jordan tightly regulate polygamy. There, polygamy can only be carried out with a written permit from the court, after the man has obtained an oral and written agreement from his wife beforehand. Even then, permission would be granted only if the husband's livelihood is deemed sufficient to support two households. On the other hand, Muslim countries such as Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco implicitly prohibit polygamy and sentence polygamists with a prison term and a hefty fine. Polygamy is a legal practice in Malaysia and Indonesia, but in Indonesia the overall public opinion towards it is highly negative, a notion reflected in the findings of this study.

FIGURE 6

Are you willing to marry someone from a different religion?

MALAYSIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDONESIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don't know / No answer

Surveys in Malaysia and Indonesia

In contrast to their views on polygamy, nearly all Muslim youth in Indonesia and Malaysia hold traditional views on interfaith marriage. The majority of them disagree with interfaith marriage. Even if they are willing to marry a spouse of a different faith, they wish for them to convert to Islam. In this regard, it should be noted that the view of Islamic scholars on interfaith marriage is split into three different schools of thought with conflicting views. The first absolutely disagrees with interfaith marriage (as it is haram or taboo in Islamic law); the second agrees with a Muslim man marrying a non-Muslim woman, but not vice versa. This school of thought's reasoning is that women are weak and therefore liable to convert to their husband's religion. This system of thought is the view adopted by the majority of Muslims. Therefore, it is surprising that interfaith marriage is practised so widely throughout the Islamic world. The third school of thought agrees with interfaith marriage for both men and women. Their grounds are that if Muslim men can marry non-Muslim women it can be done vice versa, as men and women are equal humans created by God.

The use of the headscarf has become a lot more widespread in recent years, especially in Malaysia, where the dressing habits of Muslim women have changed profoundly. Most photos of Malaysian women between the 1950s and 1970s from all classes of society and geographic locales rarely show them wearing the headscarf, unlike today. In a number of instances, there is a picture of a headdress, but they do not exactly meet the criteria set by conservative religious thinkers today. Only recently did girls in elementary schools start wearing the headscarf.

The wearing of the headscarf in Indonesia and Malaysia first became popular in the 1980s, a development some experts believe was an impact from the Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, the wearing of the headscarf over the past two and a half decades has become increasingly widespread. In Indonesia, the wearing of the headscarf particularly increased following the Reformation era. The spread of Islamic parties and transnational organisations was also a significant influence. The headscarf has become the symbol of a woman's Islamic identity. Even so, there are still many Muslim women in Indonesia and Malaysia who hold prominent positions but do not wear the headscarf. The same thing is true for many wives of senior officials and powerful businessmen.

It is interesting to note that although many Malaysian Muslim youths do not constantly carry out other obligations of their religion such as praying five times a day or reading the al-Qur'an, nearly 70% of them urge for the headscarf to be made compulsory for women. More men than women urge for this. Surprisingly, Malaysian respondents with a secondary school education are more liberal over the headscarf issue than university graduates or those with a diploma. 66.9% of secondary school graduates call for the headscarf to be compulsory compared with 81.3% of those with a university degree or 73% with a diploma – an interesting fact that may point, however, to stronger peer group pressure and increased institutional control than to a proportional relation between education and religious regulations.

Malaysian Muslim youths are very clear in their preference for Shariah and Hudud law, despite their laxity in carrying out their religious obligations. Over 70% would rather follow Shariah law than the Federal Constitution. However, only 50% of Eastern Malaysian Muslim youth would condone such a choice. More men than women wish for Shariah law to be implemented – perhaps because it favours men.

A surprising finding is that the majority of Muslim youths in Malaysia and Indonesia agree to the imposition of Hudud punishments, which call for the cutting off of hands for thieves, death sentences for murderers and whipping for anyone caught drinking alcohol. These are the data in more detail: 71% of Malaysians and 50% of Indonesians urge the punishment of cutting off the hand of anyone who commits hudud offenses.
found guilty as a thief. 92% of Malaysians and 68% of Indonesians support the punishment of whipping of alcohol offenders, while 92.5% of Malaysians and 66% of Indonesians agree on the death penalty for murderers. It is interesting to note that more women than men support the call to cut off a thief’s hand. The older respondents are more vocal in calling for Hudud law and they are also more likely to call for alcohol drinkers to be whipped.

The rather conservative outlook of Muslim youth in Indonesia and Malaysia on religion and social life does not appear to be conducive to building modern democratic, pluralist and humanistic societies. Religious conservatism can be potentially incompatible with democratic principles, such as the freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, freedom of worship and freedom from discrimination.

Indonesia’s history created a specific relationship between religious and state or public values that is different from the one in Malaysia. Although the majority of Indonesians are Muslim, the nation’s founders acknowledged Pancasila as their ideological basis. Pancasila (Sanskrit for ‘five principles’) became the major force behind national, public and private life. This political philosophy has no precepts that are incompatible with Islamic teachings. The principles of Pancasila strongly reflect moral and religious messages, which are known in Islam under the term maqasid al- syariah or the common good. The nation’s founders clearly refused to ground their nation on religion. Religion was only used as an ethical basis, not as an ideological one.

In Malaysia, however, it appears that during the last few decades the idea of an “Islamic state” has gained much ground. This was not always so. Whilst the first and third prime ministers (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra and Tun Hussein Onn) openly declared that Malaysia was a secular state with Islam as the official religion – the fourth prime minister, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, declared that Malaysia was an Islamic state.

The difference between “official religion” and “state religion” is further complicated by the fact that Malaysia is a federation of states in which Islam may or may not be the state religion. For example, Sabah’s condition for entering the “Malaysia Agreement” was that there would be no state religion. Therefore, perceptions of religious laws are bound to differ from state to state.

### FIGURE 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cutting off the hands as a punishment for thieves</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death sentences for murderers</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whipping for alcohol drinkers</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FIGURE 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>do you think that technology is important for the young people nowadays?</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five activities that are most liked by young Malaysian people in their leisure time are watching TV (75%), listening to music (61.7%), surfing the Internet (52.2%), reading magazines or newspapers (47%), taking a walk (39.9%), activities with family members (36.1%), and exercising (32.3%). On the other hand, only 14.5% of young Malaysians and 26.2% of their Indonesian counterparts go to the mosque in their spare time. The respondents include those who graduated from religious schools.

It seems that technology is very important for young Indonesians and Malaysians of various ages and educational levels. Cellular phones, computers and other gadgets are their constant companions at work and in their leisure time because they enable them to keep in touch with their friends and entertain them with music and games. Watching television, listening to music and surfing the Internet are common ways to spend their leisure time.

For the respondents, reading books in their spare time is apparently not very popular they are more inclined to read magazines and newspapers. Most university graduates watch television in their spare time, though the percentage that do so is lower compared with respondents with a lower educational level. However, this still shows the popular appeal of television compared with other activities.

Technology widens young people’s general knowledge and it comes with style and design that raises young people’s wish to own luxury items. Outfits, shoes and accessories designed by famous designers are sought after, as they are status symbols: 60% of Malaysian Muslim youth say that owning designer clothes is important to them.

The majority of young people in both countries says that their financial situation is sound and that they did not experience or participate in violent incidents in their recent past. However, as with young people elsewhere, they still face problems, frustrations and stress. The three leading causes of stress for both Malaysian and Indonesian youth are lack of money, problems in school and work.

Controlling emotions, especially stress, has taken a mental and physical toll. Confiding to friends is the respondent’s favourite way to ease stress. Others choose to just let it go away by itself – interestingly, more Malaysian youths choose this manner of coping (20.9 % to 12.7 %). A smaller number of participants, most of whom are women, choose to confide in their family to deal with their stress.
Muslim Youth in Southeast Asia

Surveys in Malaysia and Indonesia

When it comes to values, the respondents generally admitted that belief in God is the most important thing in their lives. Older respondents view piety and carrying out religious obligations as main values, whereas younger respondents view hard work, creativity, and ambition as important values.

When the respondents were asked about sensitive issues such as premarital sex or homosexuality, most of them show a mainstream approach: no pre-marital sex, no gays and lesbians, no bikinis or tank tops.

Similarly, almost all participants reject interfaith marriage and wish for their partners to convert to Islam. The respondents showed interest, knowledge and practical care in a number of global humanitarian issues such as HIV/AIDS, the vanishing of traditional values and cultures, layoffs, and the prospect of losing their jobs without having another source of employment. There is no significant difference between Indonesian and Malaysian respondents in addressing these issues.

Most of the respondents from both Malaysia and Indonesia express their willingness to be involved in various social activities. Nearly all are interested and want to participate in various activities that are held to protect the environment and animals, improve the lives of the handicapped, help poor and neglected elderly people, as well as conserve culture and tradition. When it comes to social activities, most of them prefer to hold group activities, whether in the office, at school or at university.

POLITICS

YOUNG PEOPLE IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA ARE NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN POLITICS.

Young people in Indonesia and Malaysia are not particularly interested in politics. While 23% of Indonesian youth admit to some interest in politics, and 27% of them state that they participate in regional elections, hardly any Malaysian Muslim youths (0.8%) would want to become politicians, this profession would in fact be the least of their ambitions and dreams in their lives. Especially Malaysian university students have all the reason for such strong feelings: A 1971 law for universities and institutes of tertiary education prohibits students from participating in politics. The students are instead encouraged to join the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students (Persatuan Nasional Mahasiswa Muslim Malaysia), which holds motivational courses and tutoring for students, and the Peninsular Malaysia for Malay Students Federation (Federasi Malaysia Semenanjung bagi Mahasiswa Melayu), which helps Malay students succeed in their studies on an individual level. The government’s dislike of student participation in politics has resulted in students losing interest in politics.

This general distance from politics in Malaysia is accompanied by some apathy towards elections. About 66.3% of those eligible to vote have never registered to vote, another 20% have never voted, while only 11.6% participated in every election. Women are more likely to exercise their right to vote when compared with men.

Although there is not so much general interest in politics, young people in Indonesia and Malaysia are aware of the importance of politics and democracy. Most of them state that the people should have the power to change a government that is not to their liking and that opposition parties are essential to a good democracy. They state that good leadership has nothing to do with gender issues, as good women leaders fully deserve support. More men are highly aware of the need to exercise their right to vote, though they have less knowledge about politics and democracy. Awareness of the importance of politics and democracy is highest among older and well-educated respondents.

CONCLUSION

Muslin youths in Indonesia and Malaysia are similar to their counterparts in other countries. They are content, satisfied and optimistic about their lives and their respective countries’ futures. Though their social and religious views are still conservative and even fatalistic in some aspects, they have a positive self-image. All in all, they are energetic, creative, hardworking and ambitious, and see the importance of getting a quality education.

When it comes to their lifestyle, these young people rely on technology to communicate and to fill their spare time. They make extensive use of the new media (internet and smo), and they are also inclined to study technical subjects in universities. For entertainment they listen to music (modern and religious) and watch TV and Western movies. They do strive hard to improve their personal well-being and in their effort to seek jobs with good income. Technology has undoubtedly become most influential in the secularization of the young Muslim community and it is dominated by its rational-scientific principles with no intrinsic metaphysical values. Such a technological advancement has provided the Muslim youths with a huge amount of knowledge and information that the parents and grandparents do not possess.

In some aspects this gives the reciprocal impression that overwhelming secular experience and existence has made these Muslim youths technologically savvy. However, they are not becoming de-islamised. They may be superficial in their practice of and knowledge about Islam but they nevertheless perceive themselves as religious even though their overall religious outlook and practice may show more personal orientation.

Most youngsters do not choose to be involved in collective religious or political activities, but they overwhelmingly (92%) express their willingness to engage in some form of social work that relates to environment and animal protection, to helping the disabled, the poor and the aged. They state concern for humanitarian global issues such as HIV/AIDS, international conflicts, natural disasters, as well as the preservation of traditions and local cultures. They prefer to join collective social engagement at the place they study, and working together with peers is high on their list.

In terms of ethics and ethos, the young ones put hard work, ambition and creativity at the top of their list, as opposed to emphasizing religious activities and duties, which they believe were on top of their parent’s list and yet they strongly believe in God. It is not surprising therefore that success and failure in life, in their view, is determined by fate. However, they are prepared to learn something new, to have fun in life and push their will through to achieve their ambition.
As for family orientation, the respondents are strongly devoted to traditional values. They dream about the happiness of raising a family and having children - more than two if possible. Marriage is viewed as a yardstick of happiness. If their spouses-to-be are non-Muslim, they want them to convert to Islam. They are divided whether to raise their children with a stronger religious component or to let the children grow up like they did. All in all, they want to be a good parent.

They describe the relationship with their own parents as good, though they may not set aside too much spare time to spend with their families. They also do not confide in their parents in times of stress. The respondents do not view the way they were raised and taught by their parents as ideal, so they want to find their own different way of raising and educating their children in the future.

With regards to the strong religious component of family life to which the majority of youths refer it comes as a surprise that not all of them always carry their religious obligations as they are meant to: they do not always pray five times a day, fast during the holy month of Ramadan, or recite the al-Quran regularly. They admit to only having a little understanding of the verses of the al-Quran and they certainly do not head to the mosque in their spare time, but prefer to watch TV, listen to music, or surf the Internet. One could say that extremist attitudes and fundamentalist behaviour is distinctly alien to their religious practice.

Nearly half of them (42.4%) grew up socialized by very religious parents but they turned out to become moderate themselves. Remarkably, more than 60% have not seen or experienced violence in the last 12 months. They heard about the rules for wearing headscarves, Hudud laws, cutting off hands of thieves and caning for Muslims drinking alcohol but none of them mentioned any Quranic verses that would support these rules.

Lastly, in the matter of politics, the respondents are mostly disinterested and avoid any involvement as voters. But this does not mean that they are ignorant of politics and democracy, because they like to learn about political issues, for example, in civic education classes at school and they conduct a moderate participation and involvement in social organizations. They are aware that people have a right to overthrow incompetent rulers.

Unlike their Malaysian counterparts, most young Indonesian Muslims tend to distrust the government and disagree when asked whether religious leaders should play an active role in politics. Overall, the political passion adopted by the respondents is a consistent one. They may not be very interested in politics but appreciate good leadership in their country. Of course, they are very aware of what is happening socio-politically and in economic terms. Indeed, they expressed appreciation and satisfaction with consistent one. They may not be very interested in politics but appreciate good leadership in their country. Of course, they are very aware of what is happening socio-politically and in economic terms. Indeed, they expressed appreciation and satisfaction with them.

All Muslim youths in Indonesia and Malaysia express a strong pro-Muslim worldview when it comes to international politics. According to them even President Obama of the USA cannot resolve the Muslim problems in the world, such as the Palestinian issue which is very high on their list of concerns. They see the positive side of globalisation as a phenomenon of progress and economic prosperity, but they also see the negative impact of globalisation in its destruction of the environment.

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Notes

The text of the Country Report Malaysia was collated by Dr. Volker Wolf, the director of the Goethe-Institut Malaysia and Maritz Kleine-Brockhoff, Project Director Malaysia Friedrich Naumann Stiftung for the Freiheit by making use of three different articles written by Datuk Dr. Chiam Heng Keng, formerly Professor of Social Psychology at Universiti Malaya, Tunku Abidin Muhirz, Founding President of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) and Dr. Wong Chin Huat, political analyst and lecturer at Monash University Kuala Lumpur. All authors have agreed that their ideas have been represented correctly and conscientiously in this text. The original texts can be found online at:

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The country information published on pages 6-9 were retrieved from the following sources during the months of April and May 2011:

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