

stitute the object, but reveals it in its self-development.
Language, then, can never be wholly univocal or simply referential
because language is always also referring to the difference that
subsists between language and Reality. This very referring betrays
the necessity for the reference, i.e. avows the difference be-
tween what refers and what is referred to.

It can be argued that the referentiality of language for
Hegel consists in its dissappearance as a reference. Language
has a presentifying (vergegenwärtigung) function, and fulfills
this function most precisely when it disappears as language
and lets the object appear, as it were, in its own right. This
vanishing quality of language led Guy Debrock in his article to
remark that "the word is insofar as it disappears qua appearance."²⁹
Hegel himself substantiates our interpretation: "in the very act
of mediation, the mediation itself vanishes."³⁰ As language lets
the object appear, language ceases to become an object of concern.
Language exhausts itself in the presentation of the object and
remains only as the implicit possibility of the continuous pre-
sentation of the object. An interesting implication of this

good

The final truth of the propositional form, then, is found
in the disappearance of the form itself as problematic. When the
form becomes truly presentational, only the presented object appears.
The proposition recedes into its implicit position. The identity
of language and Reality, then, consists in the fact that language
and reality are capable of disappearing into each other, and for that
reason, are resolved into a greater unity:

To the question, "what is this?", we
answer, "It is a lion, a donkey, etc.",
it is, i.e. it is not at all something
that has yellow feet and so forth, not
something self-subsisting, but it is a
name, a sound of my voice - something
entirely different from what it is in
intuition, and this is its true being.³¹

The propositional form is always involved in plurivocal
reference not only because it refers both to what is and what is
not, but because in referring to any moment of the development
of the object, it implicitly refers to the other moments which,
taken as a unity, constitute the object's completion. A univocal
reference would freeze the object's temporal development; it could
only refer to a single moment and mistake it for the whole. He-
gelian reference must always intimate that which it is not making
explicit in the judgement. Hence, every "is" contains

As Being
Nothing



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