

stitute the object, but reveals it in its self-development. Language, then, can never be wholly univocal or simply referential because language is always also referring to the difference that subsists between language and Reality. This very referring betrays the necessity for the reference, i.e. avows the difference between what refers and what is referred to.

It can be argued that the referentiality of language for Hegel consists in its dissappearance as a reference. Language has a presentifying (vergegenwärtigung) function, and fulfills this function most precisely when it disappears as language and lets the object appear, as it were, in its own right. This vanishing quality of language led Guy Debrock in his article to remark that "the word is insofar as it disappears qua appearance."<sup>29</sup> Hegel himself substantiates our interpretation: "in the very act of mediation, the mediation itself vanishes."<sup>30</sup> As language lets the object appear, language ceases to become an object of concern. Language exhausts itself in the presentation of the object and remains only as the implicit possibility of the continuous presentation of the object. An interesting implication of this

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The final truth of the propositional form, then, is found in the disappearance of the form itself as problematic. When the form becomes truly presentational, only the presented object appears. The proposition recedes into its implicit position. The identity of language and Reality, then, consists in the fact that language and reality are capable of disappearing into each other, and for that reason, are resolved into a greater unity:

To the question, "what is this?", we answer, "It is a lion, a donkey, etc.", it is, i.e. it is not at all something that has yellow feet and so forth, not something self-subsisting, but it is a name, a sound of my voice - something entirely different from what it is in intuition, and this is its true being.<sup>31</sup>

The propositional form is always involved in plurivocal reference not only because it refers both to what is and what is not, but because in referring to any moment of the development of the object, it implicitly refers to the other moments which, taken as a unity, constitute the object's completion. A univocal reference would freeze the object's temporal development; it could only refer to a single moment and mistake it for the whole. Hegelian reference must always intimate that which it is not making explicit in the judgement. Hence, every "is" contains

**Kako  
lahko  
beremo  
Hegla**