Animal rights   Solidarity with animals

Today, the concept of solidarity is often associated with human communities: supporting marginalized groups, advocating for social justice and building bridges to close cultural gaps. But what about solidarity with nonhuman beings: can—or should—we extend this sense of moral responsibility to animals? This question becomes especially pressing when we learn of individual stories of animals who, like us, experience suffering and joy and are able to form social bonds. One such case is that of Ely, a female elephant in captivity in Mexico City, whose life may help to shed light on the ethical debate surrounding animal rights.

Ely’s Case

Ely is an African elephant who was rescued from a circus in 2012. Since then, she has been in captivity at the San Juan de Aragón Zoo, northeast of Mexico City. While authorities boasted about the “quality of life” Ely enjoyed in her all-concrete facility, her story soon caught the attention of animal rights organizations—such as Abriendo Jaulas y Abriendo Mentes [Opening Cages and Opening Minds] and AnimaNaturalis Mexico—which noted that Ely, approximately 40 years old, was suffering from isolation and that her physical and mental condition was deteriorating due to stress, as well as the unnatural conditions of her confinement.

In June 2023, as part of the alleged measures for Ely, it was decided to move Gipsy, another female elephant of similar age, so that they could accompany each other. However, in January 2024, Diana Valencia, founder of Opening Cages and Opening Minds, denounced that the elephants were being hidden by the zoo and that their condition was unknown. Zoo authorities responded that these measures were part of the mating process of both animals, even though, in the same zoo, it was evident that other species of animals were also mating to their new environment.

Ely’s story provoked waves of empathy and outrage throughout Mexico and beyond. People who previously had not cared about the plight of captive elephants were suddenly confronted with the emotional and psychological suffering endured by animals like Ely. Exposure to an animal’s personal story and the broader issue of animal welfare challenge us to extend our solidarity beyond human concerns. Ely’s life becomes a mirror through which we can see our own ethical obligations more clearly.

However, Ely’s case is not unique. Similar stories exist around the world, from Knut, the polar bear born in the Berlin Zoo, to the captive orcas in U.S. water parks. Their stories, which often reach the public through activist campaigns, resonate with people on an emotional level. But beyond empathy, the stories of Ely or Knut, along with thousands of animals who suffer daily, confront us with the question of our duty to other species.

Transforming Perception

Empathy, the ability to share and understand the emotions of others, is a powerful driver of solidarity. The more we know about the lives of animals, the more difficult it becomes to ignore their suffering. It is clear that animals cannot share their interests with us. For this reason, philosopher and animal ethicist Lori Gruen goes so far as to argue that developing empathy for animals and their way of experiencing the world is our moral obligation.

For his part, the Australian philosopher Peter Singer considered that the capacity to suffer—and not so much intelligence or species of a living being—should be the criterion for moral consideration, because otherwise we are incurring a type of discrimination: speciesism, which is, in general terms, the belief that human beings are superior to those who do not belong to this species. From his perspective, knowing the stories of animal suffering, like Ely, forces us to extend our solidarity towards them. In this way, we begin to see their suffering no longer as something foreign, but as something that demands our moral response.

The dynamic of exposure to animal stories and suffering, coupled with empathy, is particularly relevant when we look at the growing animal rights movements. In Germany, for example, where animals are constitutionally protected, public campaigns and legal actions have raised awareness of the importance of animal welfare. Similarly, in North America, significant cases—such as PETA’s [People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals] campaign against SeaWorld to end the exploitation of dolphins and whales, which was highlighted in the documentary Blackfish (2013)—have sparked broader debates about the ethics of animal captivity. In both contexts, the exposure of concrete, individual stories has played a crucial role in changing public opinion and fostering solidarity with animals.

Humane Duty

The ethical framework of animal rights is based on the recognition that animals, like humans, have intrinsic value. Philosopher Tom Regan, for example, argues that animals are “subjects of life” (subjects-of-a-life), meaning that they have experiences, goals, and preferences that matter to them (independent of human interests) and their rights are inherent whether we recognize them or not. Regan’s theory of animal rights insists that animals should be treated as ends in themselves, not as mere means for human purposes.

Moreover, the utilitarianism promoted by Singer in this area aims to minimize suffering. If this view is considered, we must consider the welfare of animals in our calculations because their capacity to feel pain makes their interests morally significant. Ely’s case, through this lens, becomes a clear example of the failure of our moral duty. The suffering she has endured in captivity emphasizes the weaknesses of our responsibility to animals.

Is there a limit to solidarity?

Despite the growing trend to recognize animal rights worldwide, there are important objections to the idea of extending solidarity to animals. For example, philosopher Carl Cohen argues that animals cannot have rights because they are not moral agents capable of participating in a community of other beings with rights (such as humans), but Singer had already recognized this difference. Also in opposition, Roger Scruton, a rather conservative British philosopher, suggested that rights entail responsibilities.

Ely’s case and others like it, however, challenge these objections on a moral, if not strictly philosophical, level. Ely’s emotional response to suffering points out that the line between human and animal suffering may not be as clear-cut as some critics claim. If we are motivated to act in solidarity with other humans—as when we witness a natural catastrophe or genocide (erasure of a native culture)—because of their capacity to suffer, why not extend it to animals?